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ABSTRACT 
Recently, Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone some considerable changes.  In 
order to understand why this has occurred, and where Turkey’s foreign policy will likely 
go in the future, one must examine Turkey’s national identity. Today, Turkey’s dominant 
national identity reflects a blend between modern, secular, and western customs with 
traditional Ottoman and Islamic culture: a “neo-Ottoman” identity.  This synthesis of 
traditional and modern identities grew out of the 1980s and was solidified when the 
Justice and Development party (AKP), a secular party with strong roots in political Islam, 
was elected in 2002 and then re-elected twice with the largest plurality.  This revisiting of 
Ottoman-Islamic culture is reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy. Now that Turkey has 
shifted back to a greater comfort in its Ottoman-Islamic identity, it has reopened better 
relations with the Muslim world, which significantly differs from Turkey’s foreign policy 
prior to 2002.  While Turkey will continue solid relations with the West, it will only do 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. IMPORTANCE 
Turkey’s foreign policy is unique, in part, because its geographic foothold in both 
Asia and Europe provides the country with the potential to be one of the major centers or 
crossroads of global politics.  In addition to its geographical position and large size, 
Turkey’s economy has grown significantly faster than most other developing states, 
boasting the seventeenth-largest nominal GDP in the world.1 Because of its growing 
power in this strategically important region of the world, Turkey will greatly influence 
not only its Balkan and Middle Eastern neighbors, but also other large global powers, 
such as the European Union, Russia, and the United States. 
Since the United States has large interests in the Middle East, Europe, and 
Eurasia, it is crucial that the United States understands what drives Turkey’s foreign 
policy. Turkey’s foreign policy has begun to change in noticeable ways recently. This 
was reflected in its decision to take an active role in establishing better or open relations 
with Muslim states and organizations—many viewed as anti-Western—such as Iran, 
Syria, and Hamas. Simultaneously, Ankara began to show a more neutral, albeit open, 
stance toward longtime allies, such as Israel and the United States.2 But why has 
Turkey’s foreign policy changed?  The answer to this question largely lies in Turkey’s 
changing dominant national identity, which has gradually redefined Turkey’s national 
interest and, thus, its foreign policy today. In order to continue productive relations with 
Turkey, it is critical that U.S. policy makers understand the changes in Turkey’s 
dominant national identity. 
                                                 
1 World Economic Indicators Database, [Web site] 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf, World Bank, 2008.  
2 Ahmet Davotglu, Stratejik Derinlik, 281–282, in Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: 
Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 
2008, 43–44. 
2B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Exploring Turkey’s evolving national identity offers the potential to better 
forecast the future direction of Turkey’s foreign policy. Defining national identity allows 
one to understand a state’s national interest and “can affect predictions about future 
action”3 or, in other words, “national interest—what states want—drives foreign policy.”4  
The current ruling party, the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi] 
(AKP), led by Tayyip Recep Erdogan, has helped consolidate a new dominant national 
identity that has been growing since the mid-1980s, during the reign of the Motherland 
Party [Anavatan Partisi] (ANAP), led by Turgut Ozal.   
This dominant national identity reflects a synthesis between Turkey’s Ottoman-
Islamic history and culture with its nationalist, secular, Western, modern traditions that 
the state was founded on by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, this dominant national identity will be called “neo-Ottoman”5 or “synthetic”6 
identity. Beginning with Ozal’s liberalization reforms and continuing through the AKP’s 
reforms, Turkey has seen a growing transformation of its dominant national identity, 
largely differing from the staunchly secular-nationalist identity it possessed before the 
mid-1980s.  Since their first election in 2002, the AKP has furthered the neo-Ottoman 
identity, making it the dominant national identity that presides over Turkey today; as 
reflected through the AKP’s large number of votes making them the largest plurality and 
dominant political party in Turkey. As a result of this identity shift, Turkey’s foreign 
policy has changed as well; “Identity plays a significant role in the construction and 
application of foreign policy.”7  Conversely, foreign policy also has a large impact on 
                                                 
3 Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrara, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, “Identity as a 
Variable,” Perspectives on Politics, December 2006, 33. 
4 Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security 
Interests, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2009, 1. 
5 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism,” 
Middle East Critique 7, iss. 12, 1998, 19. 
6 See Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg explain the “synthesizers” of moralist and globalist 
ideals in the Middle East and North Africa, but mainly Turkey, in Globalization and the Politics of 
Development in the Middle East, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2001, 200, 207–212. 
7 Bulent Aras, Turkey and the Greater Middle East, TASAM, (Istanbul, 2004), 87–88, in Graham E. 
Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, United States Institute of 
Peace Press (Washington D.C, 2007), 93 
3national identity, echoing Graham Fuller’s assessment, “Foreign policy expresses not 
only what one wants, but also what one is.”8  The large acceptance of the AKP’s social, 
political, and economic reforms serves as significant evidence that the Turks have 
welcomed a change; thus redefining the identity that represents the average Turk. This 
shift in national identity is subsequently transforming foreign policy as exemplified 
through Turkey’s changing relationships with the United States, the European Union, 
Eurasia, and the Middle East.  
C. HYPOTHESES AND PROBLEMS  
This study builds upon the theoretical framework that national identity and 
foreign policy have an impact on each other.9  This dynamic between national identity 
and foreign policy is especially interesting in regards to present-day Turkey.  Today, 
Turkey’s dominant national identity has shifted toward a much larger acceptance of its 
Islamic traditions and Ottoman heritage while, at the same time, maintaining a strong 
connection with the initial secular-nationalist Western culture that Turkey has adopted 
since it became a modern republic in 1923.  This change has led to a transformation in 
Turkey’s foreign policy orientation which, before the AKP, had closely aligned itself 
with the United States, even after the Cold War.  Since 2002, however, Turkey has begun 
to act more independently in its foreign policy, seeking to take a leader-like and 
influential role in its region with the hopes of one day becoming a global power.10  To do 
this, the AKP has made a strong effort in building good relations toward all of its 
neighboring states, even countries the United States finds hostile.  But, rather than turning 




                                                 
8 Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, United 
States Institute of Peace Press (Washington D.C, 2007), 93. 
9 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security 
Interests, 1. 
10 Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 
10, No. 1, 2008, 83.  
4multi-dimensional foreign policy that includes bilateral and multi-lateral ties with the 
United States, NATO, Russia, and most importantly the EU, as Turkey desires to become 
a full-fledged member.11  
Since the birth of modern Turkey in 1923, Turkey has struggled with defining its 
self-image or national identity.  Many Turkish citizens have been strongly divided in 
what they identify with and continue to be today.  Thus, Turkey has been described as 
being a “torn country”12 situated between East and West with it remaining to be seen 
which side it will lean toward.  However, this thesis will argue that Turkey will not lean 
to one specific side.  Rather, Turkey has found that it is more beneficial for them to 
balance relations on multiple sides, and will continue to maintain this position as long as 
it remains in the national interest, guided by the current ruling party.  This foreign policy 
has influenced Turkey’s national identity because its leaders are re-engaging regions that 
it has neglected since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.  Many of these regions are in fact 
what encompassed the Ottoman Empire or regions with which the Ottoman Empire had 
once had close relations.  Since the head of the Ottoman Empire was also the Islamic 
Caliphate, Turkey has used its Islamic heritage to court various Islamic states in the 
Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey has also used its 
common Ottoman history and former influence to build closer relations with Balkan 
states.13  At the same time, Turkey is continuing its strong connection with the European 
Union through its hope of one day becoming a member, bettering its relations with a 
traditional foe, Russia, through revamping energy security deals, and remaining a partner 
with the United States; albeit under recent tensions.14  As a result, Turkey is establishing 
an amalgamation between what it has adopted from Western culture and its traditional 
Ottoman-Islamic culture; redefining what it means to be a Turk.   
One of the problems with this argument is that Turkey encompasses multiple 
highly influential and popular identities.  Indeed, one of the important aspects of this 
                                                 
11 Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” 82. 
12 Samuel P. Huntington, “A Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, 1992–1993, 42. 
13 Birgul Demirtas-Coskun, “Systemic Changes and State Identity: Turkish and German Responses,” 
Insight Turkey, Vol.10 No. 1, 2008, 39. 
14 Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, 93–162. 
5paper is that it attempts to show that most Turks have discharged the concept of the 
unitary, official identity set forth by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s founding father; 
but have grown to respect and recognize multiple self-images Turkish citizens identify 
with.  However, there seems to be a dominant collective identity emerging in Turkey: the 
neo-Ottoman identity.  This identity attempts to incorporate and synthesize both 
democracy and Islam; capitalism and social welfare; modernization and tradition; pursuit 
of wealth and piety.15   This has mainly been fostered through the rise of a new business 
and political elite with Islamic backgrounds.16  “This new form of political identity can 
be called neo-Ottoman (Turkish-Islamic) political discourse, and it shapes what 
constitutes Turkish national interest.”17  However, there are many other cultural images 
other Turks identify with that can conflict with the neo-Ottomans.  There is no doubt that 
many Turks find difficulty accepting a neo-Ottoman identity or may even perceive it as a 
threat.  It is also important to note that collective identities do not mean an individual’s 
identity.  Many individuals may identify more with what one may call a “sub-identity”: 
identities that reflect an individual’s ethnicity, gender, religion, local community, school, 
or family.18  However, various groups of people’s sub-identities can fall under the 
umbrella of national identity.19 Indeed, it would be impossible for a state to represent a 
majority of its individual’s identity traits.  Therefore, many refer to a national identity 
that will help incorporate some, if not most, of their own identity characteristics.20  
Moreover, national identity itself is never static and is always changing.  However, one 
can say that it is still crucial in understanding a group’s meaning and interests through 
taking “snapshots of identities as they evolve, as they are challenged, and as they are 
constructed and reconstructed.”21  
                                                 
15 See ideology and identity of AKP in M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in 
Turkey, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, 82–99. 
16 Hasan Kosebalaban, “The Impact of Globalization on the Islamic Political Identity: The Case of 
Turkey,” World Affairs, Vol. 168, Iss. 1, 27. 
17Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism,” 21. 
18 Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology,” 
Political Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, 116–117. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
21Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrara, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, “Identity as a 
Variable,” Perspectives on Politics, December 2006, 17.  
6Another important caveat is that there are other significant forces that affect 
foreign policy.  The affect globalization has on foreign policy has been a focus of other 
studies.  However, globalization also plays a large role in national identity. Other studies 
are simply placing more emphasis on the dynamic between globalization and foreign 
policy, which does not refute the claim that national identity has an affect on foreign 
policy.  In fact, globalization contributes to the continuous change national identity 
undergoes throughout time.22 Indeed, various sectors of Turkish society, secular or 
Islamist, have largely viewed globalization as an opportunity to expand their interests.23  
Thus, many have integrated themselves in global institutions, making their national 
borders “porous,” or more open to outside influence, changing the way in which Turks 
view the outside world as well as themselves.24   
Another limitation to this hypothesis worth noting is how external, powerful, 
international actors, like the present day United States, can sway a state’s foreign policy 
in a manner that would otherwise not reflect the national interests of the dominant 
national identity.  However, this does not seem to be the case with what appears to be the 
dominant Turkish national identity today.  To be sure, Turkey has become more 
independent in its foreign policy since the AKP came to power in 2002.  One example of 
this independent stance is when the AKP rejected the United States’ from staging its 
invasion into Iraq from its borders.  Previously, Turkey had been more focused on 
maintaining its geostrategic or geopolitical importance as a “buffer state” or a “bridge.” 
But today, neo-Ottomans believe that “Turkey can be a ‘center’ in the regional subsystem 
and subsequently a ‘global actor’ in the international system,” suggesting a move away 
from its former foreign policy under the Kemalist-led government.25  This suggests that 
Turkey’s present leaders have a certain wistfulness for their Ottoman past as a glorious 
and powerful empire.26 At times, this new course of foreign policy can be at odds with 
                                                 
22 Kosebalaban, “The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity: The Case of Turkey,” 29. 
23 Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, 209. 
24 Frank Louis Rusciano, “The Construction of National Identity- A 23 Nation Study,” Political 
Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2003, 364.  
25 Yucel Bodaglioglu, “Modernity, Identity, and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, 
No.1, 2008, 70. 
26 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 95 and 209.  
7the interests of Turkey’s traditional closest ally, the United States.  This is much different 
from Turkey’s former foreign policy, which tended to align itself with U.S. policies and 
ignore many of its neighboring states, south and east of Turkey.  Now, Turkey has made 
a vigilant effort toward developing better relations with all of its neighbors.  As evidence 
of this, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu, has adopted a “zero problem 
policy toward Turkey’s neighbors.”27  As a result, Turkey has been involved in building 
better relations with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Georgia, Bulgaria, and further into the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, and more of the Middle East; regions that Turkey has traditionally ignored 
or been indifferent toward until recently.  But what explains this gradual shift in Turkey’s 
foreign policy over the last five to seven years?  It will be argued that the neo-Ottoman 
identity, which grew out of the mid-1980s, has been solidified by the new political elite, 
the AKP, and has become the dominant national identity in Turkey.28  Subsequently, the 
neo-Ottoman identity has had a large impact on Turkey’s foreign policy.  
D. LITERATURE AND THEORY 
First, one must ask: Why explore the theory denoting the relationship between 
national identity and foreign policy and not other theories that help explain changes in 
foreign policy direction?  Although national identity greatly affects a state’s foreign 
policy, there are many other studies that have placed more weight on other modes of 
analysis in explaining the driving forces of foreign policy.  Some favor economic modes 
of analysis as their primary baseline for what directs a state’s foreign policy because of 
the influence a better economy has on the decision making of state leaders.  However, 
this mode of analysis is lacking, due to the fact that not all state interests are composed of 
economic advancement.29  This is especially relevant in today’s Muslim countries.  One 
only needs to look at the phenomenon of privately-owned Islamic banks in Turkey, that 
                                                 
27 Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” 80. 
28 “Dominant” national identity does not entail a “majority,” but rather implies the largest plurality 
within the Turkish population, which marginalizes other identities in the state. 
29 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 15. 
8reject charging interest and do not rely primarily on economic interests, but on the 
religious and social interests of their constituents.30 
Other studies attempt to explain foreign policy through the lens of various 
international relations theories, which also favor an economic mode of analysis, such as 
structural neorealism, suggesting that international policy is driven by the balancing of 
differences in the capabilities in the international system.31  Another dominant school of 
thought is institutional neoliberlism, which counters much of the realist perspective by 
claiming that states can coordinate with each other without constantly balancing their 
power with other states.  It believes that setting up international institutions that monitor 
state activities will create more “political transparency” and thus, “ameliorate conflicting 
interests between states.”32  Although these views have had a profound impact on the 
studies of foreign policy, they do not explain foreign policy for particular states because 
they assume state interests are primarily controlled by material factors, like military and 
economic gain for a state.33  These theorists are more interested in explaining why the 
international system works in the manner it does through historic observation and 
focusing on the rationality of state actors. However, this thesis takes the view that, “State 
interests do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors.  Interests are 
constructed through a process of social interaction.”34 The answer to the question “‘how 
people and organizations define self-interest’ lies in the issue of identity…with which 
people and organizations relate to one another.”35  This thesis will not counter what the  
 
                                                 
30 Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, 44–46. 
31 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass. Addison –Wesley, 1979. Cited 
in: Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 14. 
32 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Cited in: Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 14. 
33 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 15. 
34 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 2. 
35 Robert Keohane, “Empathy and International Relations,” in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-
Interest, p. 227 (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1990), Cited in: Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
15. 
9prominent international relations theorists have constructed; rather, it will attempt to 
place more emphasis on another mode of analysis that focuses more on sociological 
issues, primarily identity. 
In order to assess the argument that Turkey’s national identity affects its foreign 
policy and vice versa, it is necessary first to build upon a theoretical framework that 
highlights the relationship between national identity and foreign policy.  Although this is 
a relatively new concept, with studies dating back only a couple of decades, there are 
multiple new works that draw upon the dynamic between national identity and foreign 
policy. The most prominent of these approaches, until recently, has been the 
“constructivist” approach.  Constructivism can be summed up as the “focus on the ways 
in which norms, institutions, and other cultural features of domestic and international 
environments affect state security interests and policies.”36 This thesis will attempt to 
discuss Turkey in a very similar context.  However, these constructivist scholars focus 
more on how state identity is affected by the “other” rather than by the “self.”  They 
attribute a state’s identity mostly to how a state “conforms with prevailing international 
norms, not how the state views itself in the context of its own historical experience.”37  
Indeed the “other,” or international community, has had a profound and continued impact 
on Turkey’s national identity from Ataturk’s Westernization projects to the reforming 
processes seen today for accession into the European Union.  More recently, however, 
Turkey has been looking inward toward what defines its national self-image.  With a 
predominantly Muslim population, that had once been the epicenter of all Sunni Muslims, 
Turkey has started to return to its Islamic and Ottoman past, showing a deeper regard for 
its Muslim culture.38   On the other hand, the widespread use of political Islam in the last 
few decades throughout all Muslim countries has also had a significant effect on the 
interests of Turkey’s political elite today.39  Thus, it is not only the “otherness” of the 
                                                 
36 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in 
National Security,” edited by: Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, 37. 
37 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security 
Interests, 6. 
38 M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, 
22. 
39 Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, 16. 
10
West, but also the “otherness” of different Muslim countries that have significantly 
affected what Turks identify as their “self-image.”  Regardless, it is important to show 
how both the “other” and the “self” construct national identity.  
A more useful and recent study of the dynamic between national identity and 
foreign policy is Clunan’s argument for “aspirational constructivism,” which allows one 
to better understand how identity is constructed by both the “other” and the “self” and 
how it affects a state’s policy.  Through this theoretical framework, one can discover how 
“members of the political elite propagate national self-images in an effort to define ‘the’ 
national identity and interest.”40  However, it is also important to mention that although 
the new political elite, the AKP, has helped “construct” the national identity in Turkey, 
the new present-day political elite did not create the national “self-image” they represent 
from scratch.  “Elites often shape national identity and sentiment, which can have crucial 
consequences, but they rarely create national identity.”41  A large portion of the Turkish 
population, business leaders and politicians alike, have discovered and helped create this 
dominant identity, which is constantly evolving, before the AKP existed.  The AKP is 
simply answering the call of their constituents and has taken a leadership role.  
Nevertheless, Clunan’s work offers answers as to how Turkey’s leaders have helped 
consolidate this identity that contributes to their current and future foreign policy.  
Indeed, Clunan’s main argument for “aspirational constructivism” will be adopted and 
used as the primary theoretical framework for Turkey.  A summary of her argument is as 
follows: 
Members of the political elite develop aspirations based on common 
historical memories.  Motivated by value rationality and the need for 
collective self-esteem, they introduce competing national self-images into 
the political discourse.  National self-images are sets of ideas about the 
country’s political purpose and international status.  These self-images 
                                                 
40Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security 
Interests, 10. 
41 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985. 
Cited in: Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security 
Interests, 10. 
11
deploy an identity management strategy- choosing from among mobility, 
creativity, and competition- to enhance national self-esteem.42   
Just as Clunan’s case with Post-Soviet Russia represents a significant 
“institutional change,”43 so too has Turkey made “remarkable changes” in its political 
system since the AKP, a non-coalition party with strong roots in political Islam, became 
the dominant political party in 2002 for the first time.44   To better understand this 
historical political change in Turkey, “aspirational constructivism” will be the most 
important theoretical tool in explaining the affects of Turkey’s national identity changes 
on its foreign policy modifications.  
Now that a broader theory base has been established for explaining this study, 
actual historical, political, social, and economical information concerning Turkey, which 
will lead one to better understand why specific changes in Turkey have occurred and 
possibly where they will lead Turkey in the future, must be provided.  In this regard, 
Yavuz is helpful by observing directly what the specific reasons are for the gradual shift 
in national identity and foreign policy.  His work has helped show the origins of this 
transformation in Turkish national identity and how it would likely affect foreign policy.  
 Yavuz labels the national identity that has come to dominate Turkey as Neo-
Ottomanism, the very identity that has arguably been widely adopted by the AKP and 
will be explored throughout this thesis.  He states, “in recent years, Ottoman-Islamic 
origins of Turkish nationhood in particular have become more assertive and effective in 
conditioning and shaping the state’s policies and society’s perception of ‘self.’”45 
However, it is important to note that this work was published in 1998, four years before 
the AKP came to power or even existed.  This serves as evidence that the political and 
societal ideas that the AKP, and its large constituency, identifies with and supports were 
developed before the AKP came to power.  Yavuz describes how this new identity has 
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come to challenge the traditional notion of post-Ottoman Turkish nationalism.  However, 
Yavuz warned how the “Ottoman-Islamic” discourse has “yet to develop into a fully 
coherent doctrine or set of ideas firmly endorsed by policy makers.”  But, soon afterward, 
he stated, “it is more likely that one will see a more pronounced ‘Islamically’ shaped neo-
Ottomanist foreign policy in the future.”46  This is interesting, because today this 
“Ottoman-Islamic” discourse does have a “coherent doctrine” since the AKP has come to 
dominate the Turkish government.  Moreover, Yavuz provided a good forecast of where 
Turkey’s foreign policy went soon after 1998 because Turkey has made such a strong 
effort in bettering its relations with its Islamic neighbors since 2003.47  Thus, Yavuz’s 
article aids this study because it serves as a testament that examining national identity has 
a significant predictive power of future foreign policy.  Yavuz supplements and cements 
this idea of neo-Ottomanism and the connection this national identity has with foreign 
policy throughout his books: Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (2003), The Emergence 
of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (2006) and in his most recent Secularism 
and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (2009).  All of these resources will be drawn upon 
throughout this study.  
Bozdaglioglu touches on many of the same topics as Yavuz in his writings. After 
he describes how Turkey’s secular identity was first formed when it became a state in 
1923, he goes onto explain how Turkey gradually began to revisit its Islamic heritage 
culminating into the rise of political Islam or “Islamism.”  Finally, Bozdaglioglu explains 
the AKP, how this party with Islamic roots represents something much different than the 
traditional Islamic parties of the past, and how the AKP has helped consolidate a national 
identity that supports secularism but at the same time is comfortable with its Islamic 
traditions.  He seems to give a fair and balanced view of the AKP by showing that this 
party “clearly supports secularism,”48 but also warns that “its approach to modernity and 
the public role of Islam carries clear signs of the party leaders’ devotion to Islam.”49  
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Ultimately, Bozdaglioglu depicts how Turkey’s national identity and foreign policy has 
gradually changed over the course of history into what it seems to represent today.   
Bozdaglioglu provides an overview of where Turkey’s national identity and 
foreign policy have come from and where they are going from a Turkish academic’s 
standpoint.  Although this is very useful, it is also imperative to explore what the actual 
foreign policy agenda is, provided by Turkey’s present-day leading political party.   Dr. 
Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s Foreign Minister and also a political scientist, is explicit in 
what Turkey’s foreign policy is today.  He believes that Turkey should be a “central 
country;” one that balances multiple regional partnerships.  He states: “Turkey’s diverse 
regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions 
simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs.”50  
Therefore, the days of Turkey simply aligning itself with Western countries have passed.  
Although Turkey will continue to interact and try to uphold its relations with the West, it 
will also make a strong effort in building better ties with all of its regional surroundings.   
Another important article that shows where the AKP stands today with its foreign 
policy is an interview with Turkey’s Prime Minister and chairman of the ruling AKP, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  This piece was labeled “A Union of Civilizations,” which 
challenges Samuel Huntington’s controversial book, A Clash of Civilizations.  This 
interview is important because it shows how Turkey’s foreign policy orientation toward 
the EU is still extremely important to Turkey.  When asked why Turkey, with its cultural 
differences, should become a part of the EU, Erdogan responds that, if Turkey is accepted 
in the EU, “this will change the view of the Islamic world toward the EU in a positive 
manner and vice versa.  At this point in history, Turkey has a special role as a pivotal 
state between Europe and Asia.”51  The AKP, led by Erdogan, has strived to incorporate 
both its secular ideals and the freedom to express one’s own religion, mainly Islam.  
These ideals have helped consolidate a national identity in Turkey.  In turn, this identity 
has also affected Turkey’s foreign policy, and vice versa, as seen in both Erdogan and 
Davotoglu’s ideas of what Turkey’s foreign policy should be.  So far, the acceptance and 
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popularity of the AKP’s actions have shown that Turkey is comfortable with developing 
productive relationships with almost all of its neighbors, as well as with other global 
powers.  Basically, Turkey seems to be open for increasing its relations with almost all 
states that can help serve its national interest.  These new foreign policy initiatives have 
also impacted Turkey’s society with greater interaction from all sides of its borders.  
Thus, Turkey’s identity is being influenced by both the Muslim world and the West as 
well.   Turkey’s President, Abdullah Gul, states: “At a time that people are talking of a 
clash of civilizations, Turkey is a natural bridge of civilizations.  All we are trying to do 
is use our position to bring Islam and the West closer together.”52 
Graham Fuller examines how Turkey has started to make this change in both its 
foreign policy and national identity.  His book is useful because it is from the perspective 
of someone who lives outside of Turkey; a U.S. citizen who studied and lived in the 
region for much of his career as a United States CIA agent.  The most useful aspect of 
this book is how Fuller outlines Turkey’s past and present policy toward all states and 
regions that affect Turkey.  Afterward, he makes multiple suggestions of where Turkey’s 
foreign policy will go in the future; whether it be a Washington-, European-, or Ankara-
“centric” policy remains to be seen.53  Fuller leaves this question up for debate.  
However, this thesis will suggest that, although Turkey will try to incorporate all of these 
players, Turkey will only do so if it is in its own national interest.  This study asserts that 
Turkey is moving more toward an “Ankara-centric” foreign policy. 
Another good outside reference is Chris Morris’ book, The New Turkey: A Quiet 
Revolution on the Edges of Europe.  Although Morris is not an academic, his work as a 
journalist in Turkey for the British Broadcasting Company reflects an important 
European viewpoint.  By utilizing this source, one can gain a good overview from an 
outside eye of the multiple cultures and societies that shape Turkey.  The most important 
aspect of this book is the number of different people Morris interviews.  He records his 
interactions with a myriad of different people from different ethnicities, cultures, 
backgrounds, occupations, classes of societies, and officials at various levels in the 
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government and military.  The main point Morris drives toward is how Turkey has made 
many political and societal changes in order to shore up its bid for the EU, and that 
Turkey should not be ignored.  He states, “The biggest change of all has been the change 
in mentality.  The way the country is run is being revolutionized.”54 This is a valuable 
source because it records first-hand accounts of how Turkey’s dominant national identity 
is changing and how this is both a driving force as well as a consequence of foreign 
policy. 
Examining and collating the works of authors from different parts of the world 
and different perspectives helps offer a balanced analysis of the dynamic between 
Turkish national identity and foreign policy.  But how does one measure what these 
authors provide? Utilizing multiple surveys can help supplement or support—or even 
refute—what these authors add to the analysis of this thesis.  The surveys that will be 
most useful consist of The International Republican Institute “Survey of Turkish Public 
Opinion: March 29-April 14, 2008,”55 the Turkish Electoral Geography,56 and The 
International Strategic Research Organization “Foreign Policy Perception Survey: 
Turkey’s Future in the EU: October 2004.”57  All of these resources offer reliable data 
concerning the feelings of the actual Turkish population.  This is imperative when 
studying an issue at the national level.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to support the hypothesis that the gradual shift in Turkey’s national 
identity has affected its foreign policy, this thesis first drew upon the theoretical 
frameworks of various political scientists who assess the dynamic between national 
identity and foreign policy; mainly Clunan’s argument for “aspirational constructivism.”    
Each chapter will refer to empirical data that examines the trends of Turkey’s political 
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and societal discourse and relate it back to the theoretical framework in order to support 
each argument.  Turkey’s national identity and foreign policy will be observed in 
conjunction with each other, chronologically denoting what it used to be, when it started 
to change, what it is today, and where it will likely go in the future.  The sources used are 
from Turkish academics, journalist, and politicians, which allow one to better understand 
what Turks think in regards to their own national identity and their foreign policy.  Then 
the input from these Turkish sources is compared to input from those who are not 
Turkish, but have a good grasp of Turkish culture through their own experiences and 
studies of the region.  Finally, all historic sources will be measured through the use of 
surveys.  Although the primary sources mentioned in the literature review are drawn upon 
heavily, a lot of other recent literature will be used through various news articles from 
different parts of the world. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II will give a brief history of 
modern Turkey, touching on Turkey’s past national identity and foreign policy.  Chapter 
III will examine when, why, and how Turkey’s national identity started to change.  
Chapter IV will discuss Turkey’s ruling party, the AKP.  It will show how the AKP has 
helped consolidate a new dominant national identity, which has emerged and evolved 
over the last few decades.  At the same time, the recent trends in the AKP’s foreign 
policy will be observed and related to Turkey’s dominant national identity.  The fifth 
chapter and conclusion will consist of a recap of the thesis and a predictive assessment of 
Turkey’s near-future foreign policy. 
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II. TURKEY’S BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF PAST 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Turkish citizens as a whole have been forced to endure multiple questions about 
what dominant group they identify with.  Following the Turkish War of Independence 
ending in 1923, some have identified more with secular, Western culture, while others 
have oriented themselves more with Islamic culture.  Because of this divide, some have 
described Turkey as a “torn country.”58 The origins of Turkey’s initial dominant national 
identity must be reflected upon, in order to understand how it has moderated and changed 
into what it is today.  By doing this, one can see how Turkey’s past national identity was 
constructed, why it was created in the manner that it was, and the problems with it.  This 
will mainly be discussed between the formation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and 
the liberalization reforms of the 1980s.  The political elite’s actions during this time 
period will be examined and linked to the theoretical framework, which will support why 
Turkey’s national identity existed in the manner it once did and how it corresponded with 
its foreign policy.   
Before the Republic of Turkey existed, the Anatolian territory served as the center 
of the Ottoman Empire for six centuries.  The Ottoman Empire was the largest, longest-
standing, and most powerful empire in Islamic history, ruling not only over Anatolia, but 
the Balkans, and large parts of Arabia and North Africa.59   It held the seat of the Islamic 
Caliphate, who served as both sultan and supreme leader of the Sunni Muslim world, 
which enabled successive rulers to have an influential bonding force among multiple 
ethnicities and cultures scattered throughout the empire.60  It is no wonder that many in 
modern-day Turkey, especially those outside of urban centers, have continued to hold 
onto their Islamic values and traditions.   
However, as the 19th century drew on, this over-arching bonding force 
diminished as nationalism spread throughout Ottoman territory and British and French 
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empires became evermore powerful.  But it wasn’t until after the Ottoman Empire’s 
defeat in World War I that the Allied Powers of France and Britain exerted direct or 
indirect control over almost all of the Middle East, carving up territorial borders that 
balanced the power of the British and French empires and weakened the newly-
established Middle Eastern states. However, French and British Imperialism ended at the 
borders of Anatolia, what is now known as Turkey.  Turkish nationalists rallied around 
their most charismatic leader and military hero, Mustafa Kemal, in their War of 
Independence, rejecting the draconian terms of the Treaty of Sevres. By sacking the 
Greek army in 1922, Mustafa Kemal or “Ataturk” (Father Turk) forged a powerful 
unifying element among many ethnic-Turks through war.61   
The War of Independence was a watershed moment in helping create Turkey’s 
first national self-image.  The war helped distinguish a sense of “Turkishness” apart from 
an “other;” being their enemies in the West, which wanted control over their homeland.  
“The more positively people distinguish their ingroup from the outgroup, the more their 
self-esteem rises.”62 Indeed, the Turkish nationalists military not only fought together, 
they won together.  Their victory over Greece and successful defense of Istanbul from 
expansionist Britain culminated in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, where Turkey 
was finally recognized internationally as a sovereign state. 63   By emerging victoriously 
and declaring its independence, the elites in the Turkish nationalist movement were able 
to gain respect, creating a sense of self-esteem among many ethnic-Turks, which was 
vital in helping Ataturk and his nationalist movement establish a Turkish national 
identity.  “People’s self-respect is bound up with the esteem in which their national group 
is held.  If a culture is not generally respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its 
members will also be threatened.”64  Simply put, people are more apt to identify or feel a 
sense of belonging to a nation that can be proud of its accomplishments.  With that said, 
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“self-respect theorists are right to make the connection between a secure national identity 
and increased self-esteem, at least for those who identify with a nation.”65 
But not all of Anatolia identified with the nation of Turkey.  In other words, many 
people defined themselves as members of other groups that had been socially constructed 
in the past. In the wake of the War of Independence, however, the Kemalist era began 
through empowering only one party of government, the Republican People’s Party 
[Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi] (CHP).  “Neither the secularization nor the Turkification of 
the nation was negotiated with the people in a serious way.”66 Through the CHP’s 
monopoly of power, Ataturk was able to embark upon a massive reforming campaign, 
with little concern for most of the masses outside of urban areas. These reforms marked a 
profound breaking away from the past, essentially shutting down cultural and religious 
practices that had existed for centuries throughout Anatolia. But why subjugate the entire 
population to these new reforms?  Why break away from the past in such an extreme 
way? 
The main reason for these reforms was to implement a strategy that would mend 
the new nation’s economic, social, and security problems.67  The Kemalists, many, of 
whom were educated in Europe during the late Ottoman era, believed that the best and 
easiest way to solve these problems was to secularize and modernize society in a 
European image and relinquish Turkey’s traditional Ottoman-Islamic, “backward” 
practices.  Thus, their age-old practices were then replaced with more “civilized”68 
Western practices.  Because of this, Turkey began to isolate itself from another “other,” 
that of the Islamic world.  The Kemalists believed that by emulating the West, Turkey’s 
economy and society could thrive like the West and, if needed, Turkey would have 
greater power in fending off the West or other foreign powers, like the Soviet Union.  
Therefore, Ataturk framed the national interest of Turkey in a European model, which 
was seen by the Kemalists as the most progressive and effective way of accomplishing 
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modernity and gaining greater national power and prestige.69  As a result, this developed 
a new dominant Turkish national identity more closely resembling the West than the 
historical and cultural image Turks had had in the past. Many have dubbed this national 
image as the “Kemalist” identity. However, it has been perceived that by embarking upon 
these reforms, “Ataturk performed a kind of ‘cultural lobotomy.’”70  Not surprisingly, 
these reforms were also met with much stubbornness to submit to these changes set forth 
by Ataturk’s authoritarian regime.  In fact, only the urban centers were subject to the 
fullness of Ataturk’s reforms, while the rural areas were largely unaffected.  “In effect, 
two Turkey’s coexisted in uneasy harmony: an urban, modern, secular ‘center’ and a 
rural, traditional, religious ‘periphery,’ with little contact between them.”71 
Large minorities, such as the Kurdish population in rural southeastern Anatolia, 
making up about 20 percent of the Republic of Turkey, did not identify with Turkish 
nationalism or secularism. But Ataturk sought to invoke a singular national identity that 
would influence all Turks to unite and devote themselves to one sole image in order to 
amass greater national power, prestige, and security in fending off foreign powers.72   
State-building nationalism tries to impose a cultural homogeneity on 
citizens. There is an incentive for people to join the dominant cultural 
group; if people want to move ahead economically or politically, they 
must know the dominant language or culture. This is hardly a problem of 
the majority group… sometimes, however, minority nationals resent the 
need to neglect their own language or culture in order to prosper.  When 
they do not assimilate, peripheral nationalism arises, as a distinct cultural 
group clamors for its own state or some sort of autonomy.73 
Essentially, this is what happened between Turkish and Kurdish nationalist; albeit 
some Kurds assimilated into the Turkish discourse of society.  However, most Kurds 
were forced to assimilate and, when they refused, they were mostly met with brutal 
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repression by the Turkish military and police.  Public use of Kurdish and teachings of 
Kurdish were forbidden.  Many leaders of Kurdish insurrections were executed and about 
20,000 Kurds were deported from the southeast to resettle in parts of the Western side of 
the country.74  It could be argued that the Turkish hardliner nationalist, with which 
Ataturk sided concerning the Kurdish issue, felt that in order for their identity to be 
respected, they must defend Turkish “dignity, in which one’s self worth is 
engaged…since, dignity rests on a ‘common categorical identity,’ when this is threatened 
or humiliated, so are the individuals who identify with this category.”75  The Kurdish 
nationalists seemed to have threatened the dignity of the Turkish nationalists (Kemalists) 
by challenging their idea of a unitary national identity.  A splitting away from Turkey’s 
national identity as perceived by Ataturk was seen as an attack on the nation itself.76  
This conflict of interest between Kemalist Turks and ethnic Kurds ignited deep 
resentment between both groups that still burns today, which will be elaborated on later.    
But it wasn’t only the Kurds who suffered during these massive changes.  
Although Turkish nationalism was one of the most distinctive characteristics of 
Kemalism, secularism was equally aggressively implemented as a core ideal to Ataturk’s 
modernization reforming project.  However, secularism did not mean a mere separation 
of religion from state, it meant abolishment of all previous religious activity and the 
complete control over existing religious institutions.77  Kemalists felt that Islam 
represented “backwardness” and needed to be rejected if the country were to solve its 
social and economic problems. As a result, the Kemalist reforms attacked the ulema (the 
traditional leaders of institutionalized Islam), religious symbols and, most profoundly, put 
an end to the Islamic Caliphate. These reforms included removal of most religious leaders 
and university professors, removal of Islamic dress, and the adoption of the Western 
attire, Western clock, calendar, numerals, measures, and even the Latin alphabet. 78   
These reforms were all seen as great steps forward in modernizing toward a European 
                                                 
74 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 172. 
75 Halev and Morse, “National Identity and Self Esteem,” 518. 
76 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 173. 
77 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 181. 
78 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 186. 
22
image, the region of the world that was thought to be the most powerful and most 
modern, and a move away from its “backward” Middle Eastern neighbors who were 
dominated by the West.   
On the one hand, the emphasis on the Turkish heritage, even if it was 
largely mythical, as something separate from Middle Eastern and Islamic 
civilization of the Ottoman Empire, made it easier to exchange elements 
from traditional Middle Eastern civilization for those of the west.  On the 
other hand, it instilled in Turks, especially those of the younger 
generations a strong feeling of national identity and national pride, 
sometimes bordering on a feeling of superiority, in a sense 
psychologically counterbalanced the need to follow Europe.79 
However, what emerged from the suppression of Islam was not entirely what the 
Kemalist elite desired.  As stated before, much of the population, mainly the masses, 
greatly resented these reforms.  By breaking away from the past in such an extreme way, 
a backlash was created through underground religious networks.  Arguably, this 
suppression led to the rise of political Islam in Turkey, which had become more and more 
popular throughout the 20th century as Turkey became more democratic.   
So how did Ataturk successfully carry out his Westernized reforms if they 
conflicted with the core interests of large groups of people, such as the Kurds and devout 
Muslims?  One way is that the Republican People’s Party (RPP) had a monopoly of 
power and if dissenters opposed their authoritarian power they would be crushed.  
Another reason is that he was genuinely liked among many Turkish nationalists who 
were the sole elite at the time.  The masses had little, if any, power to challenge the 
Turkish elite and their nationalist and secularist stance. Nevertheless, Ataturk frequently 
toured the countryside to inspect their performance and he used more tools than simply 
the suppression of past cultural symbols and practices to help sway the opinion of many 
people and build a more modern national image through the Kemalist lens. “They 
(Kemalists) used the army, education, media, and art to consolidate Turkish national 
identity and attempt a clean break from Islam and the Ottoman legacy.”80 He, in fact, 
used history itself to influence the elite that the national image he was imposing was 
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virtuous and legitimate. In other words, “history was rewritten to bolster the new 
ethnically based nation-state.”81 In order to “sell” his movement of a new Turkish state to 
the people and abandon parts of its Ottoman heritage, Ataturk manipulated Turkish 
history during the interwar period through an extremely influential speech.  In “The 
Speech” (Nutuk) Ataturk rewrote history, glorifying the new nation of Turkey and its 
struggle for independence, while justifying his drastic changes, criticizing his rivals, and 
propping himself up as the leader of their movement.82   
This process is quite typical of nation-building as seen throughout 19th to early 
20th century Western Europe.  For example, “Union with France was suffered, not 
accepted.  The fusion with France was accomplished slowly and against the will.”83 The 
experiences in the market, schools, and military helped “sweep away old commitments, 
instill a national view of things in regional minds, and confirm the power of the view by 
offering advancement to those who adopted it.”84   Even though much of Ataturk’s 
speech contained myths and a distortion of the past, it was widely accepted among the 
Turkish population and much of its content still exists in the history books in Turkish 
schools today. “The nation’s common history as a rule has no more than limited reality, it 
is more the product of dreams and visions than the product of facts.”85 
This influential depiction of history was instrumental in supporting the new 
national identity the Kemalists sought to construct.  Clunan adds:  
It takes history, in the form of historical memory, as a serious force 
shaping the aspirations of political elites. But it also take into account 
human agency and the present situation that political elites face to explain 
how the combination of political elite perceptions of the past and present 
shape current national identity and national interests.86  
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By portraying Turkey’s new national status and its history as a positive reflection 
on the people of Turkey and its leaders, Ataturk was able to build up a sense of national 
self-esteem and pride.  As stated before, national self-esteem is vital in creating a positive 
national identity that people would be happy with and proud to be a part of.  If Ataturk 
merely suppressed old traditions and displayed no positive reasons for Turks to be a part 
of their “ingroup,” then no one would buy into their ideas or the image they wanted 
people to aspire to; Ataturk’s legacy would simply die out.  However, with this positive 
portrayal of history and the influential steering of Turkey’s cultural modernization, 
Ataturk’s vision was able to endure for generations to come.  This lasting vision of 
Turkish identity also had large implications for its foreign policy for many years.   
Constructing a new national identity for the political elite’s own domestic 
political purposes naturally transcended into its foreign policy initiatives. After its victory 
in 1923, Turkey strove for the status quo with European states, and gradually fell in 
league with them after World War II and throughout the Cold War.  It is important to 
note, however, that during the initial Kemalist era Turkey was isolationist and neutral 
during World War II.  This suggests that although Ankara wanted to modernize in a 
Western image, it was also naturally cautious to ally itself with their former foes in the 
West.  But, after World War II, with the emergence of the Democratic Party (DP), 
Turkey quickly aligned itself with the West to stave off a Soviet threat from abroad and 
communist movements internally. “Turkey’s decision to fully integrate its foreign policy 
into the West was tied to Turkey’s new Western identity constructed in the years 
following the Independence War.”87 This is shown in Turkey being one of the first 
nations to become a part of NATO and sending its own brigade of troops to fight 
alongside the United Nations in Korea.  At the same time, Turkey’s relations with the 
Middle East and the Muslim world diminished as they symbolized the “other” and the 
culture Ankara wanted to leave behind.  This is exemplified through Turkey’s willingness 
to become the first and only state with a predominantly Muslim population to recognize 
Israel as a state. While the Ottoman Empire had a bonding connection through Islam with 
the other ethnic groups throughout its borders and with many of its neighbors, the new 
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Turkish Republic not only severed its ties with Islam domestically, but joined those in the 
West who had largely rejected Islam and taken control over the Muslim world.   
Constructing a new internal and external “other” for political purposes was 
at the center of Turkish identity formation. This identity, in turn has 
shaped notions of state interest. The Turkish elite identified the Islamic 
traditions and masses as the “other”, and this internal otherness of “Islam” 
also was extended to the external otherness of the Arabs.”88 
Naturally relations withered, causing a huge rift between Turkey and its Middle Eastern 
neighbors that has existed for decades.  Only until recently has this gap between Turks 
and Arabs been gradually narrowed; albeit there still exists tension. 
However, as stated before, only a portion of the population truly respected this 
national image and the societal discourse it represented as being positive to their own 
individual interests.89 While many nationalist Turks have fought to create this European-
like national image, many have held onto their traditional religious and cultural identity, 
which they felt then and still feel represents who they are.  “The determination of national 
identity, in particular after 1925, was made strictly at the level of the statist Republican 
elite and pointedly excluded the mass of society.”90 Therefore, the Kemalists not only 
divided themselves from the Middle East and greater Muslim world, but also divided 
themselves domestically.  “Two versions of nationalism actually competed: secular 
linguistic nationalism and ethno-religious nationalism.”91 This is why Turkey has been 
widely thought of as a “torn country,” with the secular elite versus the lower class masses 
of Kurds and Islamists. This set the stage for a domestic division within Turkey that 
continues to this day. 
However, the Turkish masses of society, mainly composed of religious Muslims, 
did not lie at the bottom rungs of society forever. Turkey’s national identity was 
Westernized and, because of this, Turkey projected its foreign policy toward a closer 
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association with the West. As Turkey’s foreign policy aligned itself with the West, it was 
forced to come out of its authoritarian phase of government and become more and more 
democratic.92 This democratic shift, starting in 1950 and progressing in the mid-1980s, 
enabled more upward mobility, organization, and social interaction among the lower 
echelons of society.   
However, during this rocky 30-year period, Turkey’s democracy experienced a lot 
of political strife due to a combination of economic turmoil and the significant rise in 
radical voices.  The 1950s saw the emergence of a new elite in the Democratic Party 
[Demokrat Parti] (DP), primarily representing the masses, while distancing itself from 
the previous ruling class of intellects and military.93  Apart from the Kemalists’ old view 
to be neutralist in its foreign policy, the DP firmly aligned itself with the Western bloc 
against the Soviets.  The DP’s foreign policy closely resembles what it stood for 
domestically.  This new elite seemed to fall in line with the United States, as a country 
that was secular but allowed religious freedoms.  Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
relaxed the secularist policies of Ataturk and, suddenly, Islam became more recognized in 
daily life.94 This supports the argument that the masses never fully bought into the 
Kemalist identity and still maintained their cultural traditions of Islam. However, this was 
pure anathema to the Kemalist elite, who still harbored a significant amount of political 
power.  
To the majority of the educated elite (including civil servants, teachers and 
academics and officers) who had internalized the Kemalist dogmas and 
who themselves owed their position in the ruling elite to the fact that they 
represented the positivist, Western-oriented outlook, this admission 
threatened their cultural hegemony and their monopoly of the political 
scene and the state machinery.  This explains why their reaction to 
expressions of even non-political Islamic feeling, was little less than 
hysterical.95 
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Even though Menderes represented the masses and their desire to incorporate 
Islam in their Turkish identity, it was not enough to ward off the DP’s strong Kemalist 
opposition, especially when the country went into economic crisis.  As Turkey struggled 
with its economy, the DP took more authoritarian measures to solve the upheaval in 
society.  This did nothing except give the military, which continues to see itself as the 
keeper of Ataturk’s legacy, enough popular support to take over the government through 
a military coup in 1960.  Therefore, the next generation of secular and military elite 
representing a Kemalist image continued to maintain its power. 
Soon afterward, parliamentary democracy was reestablished, but the military now 
had the power to extend its influence over government policy through the National 
Security Council. At the same time, the new constitution, which was overseen by the 
military and adopted by the state, was more liberal than the one before it. 96   Although 
this was a move toward better democracy, it also opened opportunities for radical voices 
in opposition to the military and secular elite to create parties and a significant following, 
especially when the Turkish economy floundered once again in the late 1970s. “The 
electoral base of the Justice Party [Adalet Partisi] (AP) consisted of farmers and small 
businessmen, but its policies increasingly served the modern industrial bourgeoisie, of 
big business.  This left many of the voters disgruntled and they became the prime targets 
of the Islamic parties that were then founded.”97  Although most Islamic groups were 
outlawed, they still served as a venting and coping mechanism for the poor and the lower 
masses of society. “The religious networks and brotherhoods such as the Naksibendi and 
the followers of Said Nursi became a kind of “counter-public sphere’ and the incubator of 
a more popular Islamic identity.”98  Once democracy was implemented in the 1950s, 
these religious groups grew in popularity and eventually emerged in politics in the 1970s.  
However, most of these Islamist parties have been unrealistic in their own aims.  Some 
Islamist leaders, such as Necmettin Erbaken, have been seen as being too radical in their 
Islamic orientation, “reflecting many of the classical themes of mainstream Islamists in 
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other parts of the world.”99  Some even resorted to extremism, such as the Islamist left 
and the ultra-nationalist right, that resulted in multiple political killings throughout the 
1960s and 1970s.100  Thus, when the AP government showed no ability to suppress the 
economic crisis and political violence of the late 1970s, the military staged another coup 
in 1980. 
From this brief overview of this 30-year period, one can see that Turkey’s 
democracy had its initial problems consisting of an inability to deal with economic 
downfalls, its subjection to military coups, and the rise of radical and violent parties.  
However, much of this changed after the elections in 1983.  New economic and political 
reforms were implemented and, gradually, Turkey came out of its slump of economic 
collapse and military control.  With greater liberalization, a new intellectual, business, 
and political elite emerged from the middle and lower classes of society.  What came 
with this new elite was a new interpretation of what represents a Turkish citizen; 
challenging the previous understanding of the official Turkish national identity set forth 
by Ataturk.  Although Ataturk’s legacy of a strong secular-nationalist identity lives on, 
another national image that revisits parts of Ottoman-Islamic culture has arguably come 
to dominate Turkish society today.  The acknowledgement of this new identity came 
from the emergence of a new elite out of the lower and middle classes of society.  This 
study argues that the genesis of this shift in Turkey’s dominant national identity 
originated in the mid-1980s. 
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III. CHANGING DOMINANT NATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Under the leadership of Turgut Ozal during the mid-1980s, Turkey’s economic 
reform and liberalization was critical for enriching its democracy and enabling greater 
opportunity for the lower and middle classes of society.  With greater opportunity and 
greater freedoms, these traditionally lower classes began to grow into a modern elite.  
However, in their economic and political ascent, these classes did not carry the same 
secular and Western ideals as the Turkish elite of the first half of the 20th century—the 
Kemalists.  Rather, their ideals resembled more traditional Ottoman-Islamic values, while 
at the same time, reflecting a strong regard for political democracy, religious toleration, 
rule of law and a free-market economy.101 The Ozal era, between 1983–1993, set the 
stage for the upward mobilization of this new economic and political class, which has 
subsequently established a new dominant national identity in Turkey today. The agencies 
of change during this time period will be noted in helping support the main argument of 
this thesis.  Again, this thesis maintains that Turkey’s dominant national identity has 
broken away from its Kemalist Westernized image formed in the Ataturk era.  Rather 
than a purely Kemalist- modeled identity or a mainstream Islamist identity, Turkey’s 
dominant national identity represents a compromise between the two; a unique blend 
incorporating both Western and Ottoman-Islamic images.  This neo-Ottoman national 
identity has subsequently altered Turkey’s foreign policy from one that was primarily 
only Western oriented to one that is open to relations on all sides of its borders, showing 
a stronger regard for the interests of the Turkish masses.  How this first occurred will be 
explained in this chapter. 
For most of the 20th century, Turkey sought to establish a state dominated 
economy, one that was predominantly focused on import substitution industrialization 
(ISI).  Through high tariff barriers, Turkey directed its economy inward to protect the 
state.102 Ataturk heavily focused on advancing Turkey’s economy from the top down in 
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order to make massive economic reforms quickly, so that the country could acquire the 
resources and capital necessary to ward off impending outside threats to the stability of 
their new-found state. The main reason for this economic outlook was to consolidate the 
political power of the state “center,” and this tradition was continued on from the 
Kemalist elite as well as the Turkish military, which has always seen itself as the main 
bearer of Ataturk’s legacy of secularism and nationalism even if that restricted freedoms 
seemingly basic to modern societies.103 As a result, the means for upward mobilization of 
the lower masses throughout Anatolia did not exist, while at the same time a “self-
perpetuating power group [the Kemalists] was born, linking bureaucrats, labor unions, 
and local politicians, that was far more powerful than any private capitalist power block 
operating in Turkey.”104 
As Turkey moved out of its isolationist stage after World War II and integrated 
itself on the Western side of the international bi-polar system during the Cold War, the 
Kemalist elite looked to further its Westernized image in its own economy and domestic 
politics.105  However, even though the Turkish military supported a new constitution in 
1982, it had “no real interest in shedding its real power as the sovereign guarantor of the 
state and Kemalist ideology in favor of a true civilian democratic government.”106  In 
response to this there was a strong domestic component, mainly in the form of Islamic 
groups and Sufi orders, such as Naksibendi orders or the “Nurcu” movement that wanted 
further democratization in order to acquire their own freedom of expression, have their 
needs recognized by the state, and increase economic opportunities for the lower and 
middle masses.107   
As communication increased through advancement in technology, building of 
roads, and migration, urban areas became connected with rural society.108  As a result, 
Islamic social movements spread rapidly and their leaders’ voices penetrated extremely 
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large portions of Turkish society, urban and rural.  “Since Islam lies at the core of the 
symbolic structure of Turkish society and is the main source of shared moral 
understanding, Islam is the repository from which Muslim actors draw values, critiques, 
and judgments.”109  Because 99.8 percent of Turkey is Muslim, albeit 30 percent of those 
are Alevi (heterodox Shiite) and 20 percent are ethnic Kurds with their own sub-
identities,110 many Turks have a strong connection with various Islamic social 
movements.  The leaders and followers of these social movements are “motivated by 
value rationality and the need for collective self-esteem” in order to “generate aspirations 
of what the self should (and should not) be or do in the future.”111 The propagation of 
cultural values and common history by these Islamic social movements has served as the 
major agencies for the construction of a new Islamic identity.   
This Islamic identity is new because by the late 1980s the most popular Islamic 
intellectuals were not the traditional ulema, but the young urban Islamic intellectuals and 
businessmen.112  These prominent Turkish Islamic intellectuals and businessmen have 
stressed that “liberal political and economic order, including a marketplace of ideas as 
well as on goods and services, is essential if most Muslims are to be secure and enjoy 
tolerance and the opportunity to participate.”113 Rather than focusing primarily on revival 
of religion, these intellectuals have used religion as a building block for empowering the 
community of contemporary Turkish society so that it can challenge the state-centric 
ideology of the Kemalists elite and satisfy the needs of the lower and middle masses.114  
Moreover, because of mass communication, the number of diverse ideas about what role 
Islam should have in politics and society has led to the breakage of authoritative Islam.115 
However, this new Islamic identity that has come to dominate Turkey today did not come 
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about until the mid-1980s because there was little political or social space for this identity 
to flourish in its statist authoritarian environment. 
Until the mid 1980s, the military hindered any significant debates on national 
identity and the proper role of state and society due to the perceived threat of the Soviet 
Union, which desired control of over the Turkish Straits and the annexation of Kars and 
Ardahan provinces.116 Internally, political violence reached significant heights in the 
1970s between extreme left and radical right movements.  These domestic threats to the 
state elite also slowed down any real focus on further democratization and economic 
reform that could enable Turkey’s hidden identities to come out of the shadows and gain 
politically and economically.  As a result, the military essentially dominated politics as 
internal and external security threats became the elite’s primary concerns.  
However, this all changed soon after the Turkish military’s coup led by General 
Kenan Evren in 1980. In order to stabilize the hyperinflation in Turkey, which was one of 
the root causes of the political upheaval and the rise of radical voices, Evren advocated 
economic reform based on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program suggesting an 
export-led growth strategy rather than the ISI strategies of the past. 117   At the same time, 
he reformed Turkey’s secular political agenda by supporting a “Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis.” Instead of smacking down the opposition ruthlessly as the Turkish military 
had done initially, the military decided to tolerate, or even embrace, a certain version of 
Islam. This “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was largely taken from the ideology of Aydinlar 
Ocagi, “Hearths of the Enlightened” laid out by a network of prominent intellectuals, 
politicians, and generals.118  
The military’s move to create a “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” is not necessarily 
altruistic but, rather, a way to tackle extreme leftist and Islamic radicals that posed a 
significant threat to the state as those movements manifested at the time.119  The 
synthesis was thought to serve as an outlet for the disenchanted or desperate population, 
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while marginalizing growing radical movements. “By fusing Islamic symbols with 
nationalism, the military hoped to create a more homogeneous and less political Islamic 
community and to insulate the population from the influence of left-wing 
ideologies…and counter Islamic radicalism.”120 This ideology suggested:  
Islam held a special attraction for the Turks because of a number of 
(supposedly) striking similarities between their pre-Islamic culture and 
Islamic civilization. They shared a deep sense of justice, monotheism, and 
a belief in the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and 
morality. The mission of the Turks was to be the ‘soldiers of Islam.’ 
According to this theory, Turkish culture was built on two pillars: a 2500-
year-old Turkish element and a 1000-year-old Islamic element.121 
As with constructing the Kemalist national identity in the 1920s, a common 
historical element was imperative in constructing this new “synthetic” identity, or what 
has been argued as a neo-Ottoman identity. “Historical memory and the aspirations it 
generates are a critical determinant of what identities are accepted as self-defining.”122 
By giving historic evidence that Turkey and Islam shared a special bond, people soon 
identified with a blending or “synthesis” of these two cultural discourses.123 The support 
for this synthesis was then reinforced through state-sponsored religious education in 
public schools, as well as military schools.  State-sponsored mosques also emerged 
everywhere in the early to mid-1980s.124  After many years of suppressing religion, the 
military finally started to give ground to a major portion of Turkish society that had 
wanted to freely express their religion and culture.  This synthesis paved the way for a 
number of unprecedented liberal reforms set forth by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 
starting in 1983.125  Liberalization combined with a greater regard for Islam and Ottoman 
culture served as the foundation on which a new national identity was built. This was 
then disseminated by various Islamic social movements. 
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The Turkish-Islamic synthesis would not have survived without considerable 
incentives to encourage embracing it.  In addition to a common history, the other 
important source in creating national identity comes from people needing to “feel 
valuable, competent, and effective in order to build collective self-esteem.”126  This 
feeling of “collective self-esteem” in contemporary Turkish society was introduced when 
economic opportunity finally became available to a larger portion of the population, 
outside of the major cities of Istanbul and Ankara.  Turgut Ozal and his Motherland Party 
[Anavatan Partisi] (ANAP) were the main bearers in bringing this economic 
opportunity.127  They laid out a number of economic reforms needed to boost Turkey’s 
economy or, as Ozal once stated, “to skip an age.”128  On top of this, he and his party 
implemented many political reforms that closely reflected the ideology of the Hearths of 
the Enlightened.129 
Ozal’s political stance attracted a large number of Turks, culminating in a 45.2 
percent total vote in 1983—a much larger plurality than the other two competing political 
parties at the time. 130  He went on to serve as Prime Minister between 1983–1989 and 
then was President between 1989 and his untimely death in 1993.  One reason for 
ANAP’s popularity was that Ozal’s party line attracted a variety of interest groups.  The 
two major interest groups consist of the modern, secular, big business, industrialized 
bourgeoisie, and that of the Islamic farmers and small businessmen of Anatolia; two 
different sections of society, which had mainly been driven apart from each other during 
and after the DP’s reign during the 1950s.131  But Ozal was a successful businessman and 
large business owners liked his economic liberalization plans.  On the other hand, he also 
grew up with a Naksibendi family background and was rooted in Anatolian rural 
society.132  “He was the kind of politician with whom the average Turk could identify: he 
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hailed from Malatya, a provincial town in a backward area and he was a self-made man, 
whose own career embodied the hope and ambition of countless peasants, squatters, and 
small traders and others self employed, whom he could address in their own 
language.”133 Ozal’s charisma and effective policies allowed him to influence people in 
multiple sectors of society, rich and poor, secular and religious. As a result, he was able 
to pass a number of reforms with less resistance.  
Because Ozal’s policies satisfied the modern, Western-style bourgeoisie, there 
was less opposition to his opening up to Turkey’s Islamic side of culture.  These same 
policies invigorated a more comfortable attitude toward Islam, rather than the uproarious 
tone it had been received with earlier, which then helped propel a Turkish national 
identity with a more Islamic flavor.  In addition, it is important to note here that Ozal was 
the first one to reach out to the ethnic-Kurds by legalizing the use of the Kurdish 
language.134 Yet, the Kurds continued to be marginalized to a large degree due to the 
inception of a broadly defined anti-terrorism law, as well as penal codes that prohibit 
insults to the government, the nation-state, or any symbols of the republic, later becoming 
a huge barrier in the way of civil rights.135 These same penal codes have also been used 
frequently by the military and police against the perceived threat of radical Islamists 
taking power, most notably in the removal of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbaken in 1997, 
as will be addressed later.  Nonetheless, “Turgut Ozal’s legal openings in terms of 
expanding the freedom of association, speech, and assembly and removing the state 
monopoly over broadcasting further facilitated the communication and dissemination of 
local and global idioms.  As a result, Islamic movements constructed activist 
‘consciousnesses’ to shape the sociopolitical landscape of Turkey.”136 
By working closely with the IMF and the World Bank, Ozal made sure that his 
economic reforms were being carried out completely. These reforms “reduced state 
intervention, alleviated payment difficulties, liberalized domestic pricing, rationalized the 
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public sector, removed agricultural and other state subsidies, and banned trade 
unions.”137  As a result, these strategies have yielded considerable growth as evidence 
from the growth indicators shown in Table 1. 
 1980-1990 
Real GDP 5.21% 
Per Capita GDP (PPP) 7.12% 
Exports (million USD) 16.11% 
Imports (million USD) 11.55% 
Table 1.   Economic Growth Indicators in Turkey 1980–1990138 
As one can see from Table 2, trade increased about four-fold and foreign direct 
investment boomed.  Although the considerable rise in inflation resulted in a multitude of 
economic crises during the 1990s, the overall state debt decreased at the same time. 
 1980 1990 
Exports (million USD) 2,910 12,959 
Imports  7,513 22,407 
Inflation 45% 60% 
Foreign Direct Investment (million USD) 18 684 
Domestic Debt/ GDP 45% 14% 
Table 2.   Other Economic Growth Indicators in Turkey 1980–1990139 
It was not only the old urban Kemalist elite who succeeded during this time. With 
greater opportunity and greater freedoms, the traditionally lower classes acquired large 
amounts of capital, which soon allowed them to effectively compete with the Kemalist 
elite.  However, in their economic assent, these lower and middle classes did not carry the 
                                                 
137 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 87. 
138 Fatih Ozatay, “Turkey’s Transformation and some comments on Turkey-Syria Relations,” tepav: 
economic policy research foundation of Turkey, Ankara, 3 January 2007. 
139 Ozatay, “Turkey’s Transformation and some comments on Turkey-Syria Relations.” 
37
same secular and Western ideals as the first Turkish elite- the Kemalists. Rather, their 
ideals resembled more traditional Ottoman-Islamic values, while at the same time, 
reflecting a strong regard for political democracy, religious toleration, rule of law, and a 
free-market economy.140  This new class in Turkey has been recognized as the 
“synthesizers” of modern global ideals with traditional nativist Islamic ideals.141  The 
combination of the military’s Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Turgut Ozal’s economic 
liberalization set the stage for the upward mobilization of this new economic and political 
class with new identity traits, challenging the old identity principles of Kemalism.  This 
can be reflected most effectively through examining the emergence of a powerful civil 
society organization called the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association [Mustakil Sanyici ve Isadamlari Dernegi] (MUSIAD) in 1990.  This 
organization has combined Islamic groups, intellectuals, provincial medium-scale 
businesses, and new Anatolian industrialists to make a concerted effort to counter the 
state-backed Association of Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen [Turk Isadamlari ve 
Sanayiciler Dernegi] (TUSIAD), mostly made up of big business Kemalist elite.142  
Therefore, the pro-Islamic businessmen of MUSIAD support economic liberalization and 
privatization because that gives them the ability to compete in the market rather than 
remain in financial deadlock while the state and big businesses continue to reap all the 
economic and political benefits.143  But because of Ozal’s economic and political 
liberalization reforms, small and medium businesses and industries are hindered less in 
their success throughout Turkey. Thus, the burgeoning economic class represented by 
MUSIAD companies has continued to diminish the economic power base of the Kemalist 
elite, while bolstering its own economic base, independent of the state’s control.  
Through large amounts of economic capital and gains, Turkish-Islamic society has 
acquired the means to play a powerful role in politics.144  Representing a larger portion of 
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the population, this societal base has led the way in shifting Turkey’s dominant national 
identity, not entirely Western or Kemalist nationalist, but mixing Western and Islamic 
identities. 
Although Ozal’s economic reforms had its problems—mainly that it left the 
economy too open, which consequently led to a number of scandals—it still helped free 
many of Turkey’s diverse cultural and religious networks that had been more or less 
forced underground for the previous five decades.  With liberalization, Turkey’s “hidden 
identity within the Kemalist state”145 finally became visible.  Since most of Turkey’s 
population did not identify with Ataturk’s secular or ethnic-Turk nationalistic principles, 
a more elastic approach to the state’s multiple identities has allowed the average Turk to 
be more comfortable with modern global ideals.  For this reason, it could be argued that a 
national identity, which did not fully neglect historic Ottoman-Islamic culture, would 
have been a better fit for Turkish citizens outside of the urban centers after 1923.  
Although Ataturk’s legacy has helped Turkey become the most powerful, modern, 
democratic, secular state in the Muslim world,146 his desire to unite Turkey’s diverse 
population under one sole identity was impractical, especially as the country became 
more democratic. As a result, Ataturk’s vision of a unitary national identity that did not 
incorporate any of its past Ottoman-Islamic culture may have been an insurmountable 
task due to the impractical assumption that everyone in Turkey, many with entrenched 
ethnic or religious cultural ideals, would welcome a vastly different identity than the one 
they were more accustomed to for centuries.  “If historical aspirations and the practicality 
of a national self-image conflict with each other, the national interests the self-image 
espouses are likely to be moderated to make them more practicable.”147  Indeed, as 
further democratization took place in the mid-1980s, Turkey’s national self-image was 
moderated after many years of forcing the public to conform to Kemalist ideology.  
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Subsequently, as Turkey’s official secular national identity increasingly came into 
question, its strong Western foreign policy began to be questioned as well. The previous 
chapter discussed how the Soviet threat dictated Turkey’s foreign policy and its firm 
alliance with the United States.  For a long time this foreign policy came under fire as the 
West, led by the United States, did not show considerable concern for Turkey’s own 
regional and domestic interest. “During this period (1960–1980), the policies pursued by 
the foreign policy strategists in Ankara were less and less in tune with public opinion.”148  
Public opinion was largely against this foreign policy for a variety of reasons, but only 
four will be mentioned here.  First, President John F. Kennedy’s withdrawal of the 
Turkish-based Jupiter missiles in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 
1963 created significant doubt about NATO and U.S. interest in Turkey’s own security. 
Second, the United State’s demand for Turkey to discontinue growing poppy, due to 
concern over the ongoing global drug problem, was met with a huge negative response in 
Turkey.  Even though Turkish peasants were using poppy to produce opium, Turkey 
itself did not have a major drug problem.149  But the tipping point in the public’s dislike 
of its Western foreign policy orientation came in 1964, when a crisis ensued between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots for a second time.  President Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus 
changed the Cyprus constitution limiting the autonomy of Turkish Cypriots.  Although 
the Turkish government wanted to protect its Turkish minority from repression,150 the 
United States, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, pressured Turkey not to get involved 
militarily for fear that it would bring the Soviet Union into the conflict.  This resulted in 
sanctions against Turkey.151  The Cyprus issue continues to be a major problem facing 
Turkey’s foreign policy today.  Lastly, another nagging concern since the 1970s has been 
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committed in 1915 by the Turkish Ottoman military.  Since France and the United States 
both have large diasporas of Armenians, pressure has come from both countries that 
Turkey dig up this fragile subject.152  
However, this “Western” foreign policy soon changed when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. The Kemalist bureaucrats and military could not use the Soviet threat anymore 
as their main support for following a “single-track commitment to western policies.”153 
Coincidentally, Ozal’s economic liberalization reforms occurred around the same time 
that the Soviet Union collapsed. Thus, instead of maintaining an exclusive strategic 
posture with the West, Turkish state and society began confronting new economic and 
political interests on a more independent basis.   
This is not to say, however, that Turkey abandoned its Western orientation.  
Indeed, Europe has always been Turkey’s largest trading partner.154 Rather than totally 
reversing the course of its foreign policy, Turkey diversified its course to make it more 
attractive to the developed Western world, namely the European Union (EU).155  To be 
sure, integration into the EU has been a primary objective in Turkish foreign policy since 
1987, although this commitment wavered in the mid 1990s under Necmettin Erbaken’s 
hard-line Islamist leadership.156  To make Turkey’s geostrategic location seem absolutely 
essential to the EU as well as the U.S., it sought to build better relations with many of its 
neighbors following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  This is reflected in its “pan-
Turkist” aims in Central Asia, a region with similar ethnic and linguistic background; 
after all Central Asia was once known as Turkistan before the Soviet Union occupied the 
territory and divided it into five separate states.  Although the pan-Turkish aims were 
mostly unrealistic, due to the fact that Russia has maintained the strongest influential role 
in Central Asia, Turkey still made profound steps in building a partnership with the 
Central Asian republics through opening up a multitude of educational and religious 
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programs, making over three-hundred political and economic agreements, while 
accessing Central Asia’s vital energy sector. 157  
Not only did Turkey draw on its common culture in Central Asia, but also on its 
common Ottoman history in the Balkans. “The links with the former Ottoman domains in 
the Balkans and along the shores of the Black Sea, unlike those with Central Asia, are 
real and deeply felt.”158 When internal conflict erupted in Bosnia and Serbia’s war over 
Kosovo, Turkey took a large role in stabilizing this region and protecting its large 
Muslim minority.159  “This is the first time in Republican Turkish history that Ankara 
considered the protection of Muslims outside its borders as an integral duty of its foreign 
policy.”160 
In addition, Turkey mended its ties with former foes of post-communist Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, and Albania, making it possible to take on economic and political initiatives 
through the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Economic Cooperation 
Organization.161  “The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and renewed focus on 
Economic Cooperation Organization were part of Turkey’s new identity search.”162   
All of these new foreign policy initiatives have helped Turkey bolster its national 
self-esteem as an active leader in the region, “gaining strategic depth, and through this 
foreign policy, Turkey started to act with a new identity as a ‘central country,’ leaving 
behind the rhetoric of a ‘bridge country.’”163  Not only has this helped Turkey gain 
considerable leverage to the EU and the US as a regional power player it has helped 
strengthen a dominant national identity in Turkey that represents a combination of 
historic Ottoman-Islamic culture with modern global ideals.  By drawing on its common 
Ottoman past and culture with other countries, Islamic and non-Islamic, to aid in 
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diversifying Turkey’s foreign policy and help further its national interest, Turks started to 
better understand what Turkey’s new domestic, regional, and international role actually 
was, thus redefining what it meant to be a Turk.  
However, this foreign policy role and the consolidation of this national identity 
were forestalled during the 1990s until the AKP was elected in 2002 due to a 
combination of factors.  The Gulf War in 1991, for example, turned out to be a complete 
disaster for Turkey.  Ozal wanted to continue leveraging its geostrategic importance to 
the West in order to strengthen Turkey’s bid for EU accession.164  So he showed firm 
support for Western powers during the war by allowing them to use Turkey’s large 
military base in Incirlik.165 But, rather than helping Turkey, this only reinvigorated 
terrorist acts from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party [Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan] (PKK) 
and a loss of about US$2 billion per year, which consequently helped lead to an 
economic crisis in 1994.166   
Another hindering matter was Turkey’s reaction to the economic crisis in 1994 
and the EU’s constant refusal to accept Turkey.  These two issues allowed for the rise of 
the religious right in the form of Necmettin Erbaken’s Welfare Party Refah Partisi 
(RP).167  In 1995, his party won the largest plurality (21.6 percent) placing Erbaken as 
Prime Minister. 168   As a long-time advocate of creating a “national (Islamic) order” and 
founder of the Islamist “National View” [Milli Gorus] Movement, Erbaken was highly 
anti-Western and sought to bring more traditional Islamic values and institutions into 
Turkish politics with the belief that Turkey belonged exclusively in the Muslim world.169 
Although a portion of the population agreed with this point of view, it was mainly the 
RP’s campaigning for greater social welfare that propelled them as the dominant political 
party.170  As one can see, this was largely a reaction to the poor economy and EU 
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rejection.   Naturally, Erbaken’s more fundamentalist Islamist stance made the military 
and secular bureaucracy extremely nervous, resulting in their successful overthrow of 
Erbaken through a soft coup in 1997.  This move, however, did not restore the military’s 
former credibility to large amounts of the Turkish population.171  
This is not to say that Erbaken’s stricter interpretation of political Islam 
represented a majority view.  Indeed, a more moderate conservative form of Islam 
reflects a greater part of Turkish society as represented by Erdogan’s AK Party. “The 
results of the 2002 elections, in which the JDP obtained 34.2 percent of the votes 
compared to Erbaken’s Felicity Party [Saadet Partisi] (FP) 2.4 percent of votes, confirms 
that the conservative-moderate niche is larger than its fundamentalist counterpart.”172  In 
this way, while the 1997 soft coup led to negative perceptions of the military and secular 
Kemalists by large parts of Turkish society, negative views also developed over a 
government run by a more fundamentalist Islamic political order that was seen as too 
weak and too radical.  Therefore, a new and more effective political party under Erdogan 
was created to counter the state-centric government, which largely remained dominated 
by the Kemalist military-civilian bureaucracy and “corrupt politicians, businessmen, and 
media barons” from the death of Ozal in 1993 to 2002.173  Finally, in 2002 Turkey saw a 
return to an emphasis on further democratization, opening of the economy, human rights, 
a strong drive for EU accession, and openings to new foreign relations through the 
AKP.174  The AKP came to restore the process that was first set forth by Ozal.   
As the pendulum of Turkey’s national identity first swung toward a Westernized, 
secular, nationalist image from about 1923–1970, it swung back the other way in reaction 
toward a moralistic Islamic identity, between 1970–1980, in a more inward looking 
radical form.  Since 1980, however, the pendulum has for the most part come to rest 
somewhere in the middle; albeit the more radical voices on either side still exist on the 
periphery today.  The 1990s slowed this gradual shift in Turkey’s national identity 
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through economic crises, war, and corrupt government officials.  Nevertheless, evidence 
suggests that the majority of Turks have moderated their identities to one that implies a 
synthesis between Turkish secular nationhood and Ottoman-Islamic culture represented 
by the AKP.  Subsequently, this new dominant national identity has altered Turkey’s 
foreign policy today. 
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IV. TURKEY TODAY AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE 
JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY 
In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkinma] 
(AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, received 34 percent of the votes and 363 seats in 
parliament, becoming the dominant political party in Turkey.  Their popularity has 
endured over the last seven years for a number of reasons.  The main reason the AKP has 
been so successful is that it represents the ideals of those who have grown to identify with 
the synthetic self-image that emerged out of the Ozal era.  Now that it has been 
established what Turkey’s national identity once was, when it started to change, and what 
this new identity actually entailed, support will finally be given as to how this identity has 
come to dominate Turkey today and how it has affected its foreign policy.  This support 
will mainly be provided through the actions of the AKP and Turkey’s response.   
Even though the AKP had only been founded a year before the elections and 
contained many actors that were once strongly rooted in political Islam, it soon became 
the most popular political party in Turkey.175 How did this happen?  One reason is that 
the Kemalist opposition had repeatedly failed during the 1990s, leaving an opportune 
moment for the AKP. The Republican People’s Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi] (CHP), 
which was the political party representing the Kemalist since Turkey’s founding, 
emerged as the dominant political entity after the “soft coup” of 1997.  But a vast portion 
of the population was tired of the Kemalist’s status quo and, therefore, looked for another 
political party that could represent their own interests.  The incompetence of the CHP is 
most exemplified in their response to the 1999 earthquake, which had devastated the 
population.  The government led by the CHP was seen as unprepared and too slow to 
react.176  Another example of poor leadership on behalf of the CHP was the fact that 
Turkey’s former Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit of the CHP, was old and ill before the 
elections in 2002.  A few years before the 2002 elections, he started to make huge public 
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blunders, “At one time telling the astonished victims of a flood they had suffered an 
earthquake.”177 It was also believed that he indirectly caused the financial crisis Turkey 
experienced in 2001 as well, “Mr. Ecevit was the man who almost single-handedly 
caused last year’s financial crisis by picking a very public fight with the President on the 
day the treasury was borrowing massively overnight to service debt.”178 To top off the 
unpopularity of the CHP, there were also corruption scandals committed by CH Party 
members in Parliament.179  Yavuz sums up the public opinion prior to the elections of 
2002 when he claims, “From the sudden death of Ozal in 1993 until 2002, the country 
was governed by a group of corrupt politicians, businessmen, and media barons.  They 
used the military whenever necessary to undermine the ‘radical Islamic’ opposition.”180  
This lack of good leadership and stability within the secularist run government allowed 
for a new party to step in, promising reform with an uncorrupted past and a refreshing 
new outlook in the eyes of the public: the AKP.   
Rather than basing its party off of ideologies of the past, like Kemalism or 
Islamism, the AKP sought a compromise between the two. The AKP is a younger 
offshoot from the former RP and finds their older tactics as “immature and anti-modern 
in their criticism of the state.”181  Therefore, the AKP removed the religious right from 
the party in order for it to assimilate into the political center. 182 At the same time the 
AKP leadership reassured the Kemalists that it would maintain secularism.  But rather 
than an “assertive secularism” that prohibits public display of culture and religion, the 
AKP has taken a more “passive” approach to secularism, which allows this freedom of 
                                                 
177 Huggler, “Turks Fear Ecevit is Losing Grip on Power.”  
178 Ibid. 
179 Edward Luttwak, “Secular Turkey’s Drift into the arms of Islam; With Elections around the 
Corner, the Ruling Party has Skillfully Manipulated the Turkish Public,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), 
April 27, 2007, sec. A21. 
180 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 16. 
181 Cihan Tugal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, Stanford 
University Press, 2009, 23.  
182 Efraim Inbar, “The Turkish Elections—‘Demo-Islam’,” The Jerusalem Post, July 29, 2007, sec. 
Opinion, 13. 
47
expression.183  By making this compromise, the AKP has been more effective in 
challenging the state leadership under the Kemalists because with a synthesis of ideas the 
AKP has represented a larger constituency.  At the same time the AKP did not take a 
rigid Islamist view that was anti-West, anti-multiple religions, or anti-capitalist.  Instead 
the AKP has actually used European Union accession, globalization, tolerance, 
rationalization, and the free market to empower its constituency that opposes the 
Kemalists. In this way, the AKP and its supporters have been more effective than others 
before in accomplishing their desires to reform the state and allow a greater regard for 
society’s cultural need to freely incorporate Islam and its Ottoman past into their daily 
lives, without raising enough suspicions from the secularist establishment to overthrow 
them.184 
By turning away from Islamism toward a blend between economically liberal 
values with culturally conservative and pious Muslim values, the AKP did a number of 
things. Of these things, seven will be mentioned to support the argument that a new 
dominant national identity has emerged in Turkey reflecting the synthesis of values 
listed.  First, it enriched portions of Turkish society, mainly the new Anatolian 
bourgeoisie, with the means to become more powerful than the Kemalists in the 
economics and politics. Second, and possibly most relevant for this argument, the 
effectiveness of the AKP’s reforms constructed the collective self-esteem needed to 
support the formation of a new dominant national identity. Third, this synthesis provided 
inspiration to the lower masses, which has largely absorbed former radical Islamism.  
Fourth, it presented a return to Ozal’s policies, showing that the national image first 
constructed in the mid-1980s was looked upon positively, as evinced by the AKP being 
the dominant political party in Turkey for the last seven years.  Fifth, by 
“synthesizing,”185 the AKP garnered a larger and more diverse constituency much like 
the ANAP making it the dominant political party in Turkey.  Sixth, it built upon historic 
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aspirations in the form of Islamic and Ottoman heritage to help legitimize the national 
identity they have proposed.  And lastly, because Erdogan and the AKP have become so 
popular, powerful, and effective in their policies, which has consolidated a modern 
Ottoman-Islamic identity, it has allowed Erdogan to be more comfortable with taking on 
Islamist policies as well as take more central control over the government, which could 
prove dangerous in the future to both Turkey and its longtime allies.  
The first argument can easily be supported through the success of the new 
Anatolian bourgeoisie and pious elite represented by MUSIAD that emerged out of the 
Ozal era.  Today they represent over 7,000 businesses bringing in combined annual 
revenue stretching into the billions of dollars.186  Because of their economic dominance 
around the turn of the millennium, MUSIAD became the AKP’s most powerful 
supporter, as well as an inspiration to the multiple sectors of society the AKP represents. 
The pious business community has established hegemony, that is, it has 
made its vision the vision of pious popular sectors and activists through 
the AKP.  Almost all Islamists have come to the conservative position of 
the MUSIAD: support for unfettered markets, integration with the 
international business community, deregulation, privatization, and 
emphasis on conservative morality (deemed universal).  Yet this is not 
only MUSIAD’s hegemony but also that of existing dominant sectors of 
Turkey and abroad.187 
Ultimately, the AKP has been more successful in chipping away the power of the 
Kemalists and the identity they espouse through the economic power its constituency 
(MUSIAD) has gained.188  
These pious businessmen represent something positive for the average Turk to 
aspire to.  They supply motivation for many Turks to follow a similar path and provide a 
self-evaluation of how effective their identity traits actually are.  The AKP advocates 
these aspirations to become wealthy and successful, while express piety and cultural 
values at the same time.  Clunan suggests that political elites provide “identity 
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management strategies” to “achieve or maintain positive views of the collective self.”189  
Because the AKP’s economic policies have proved successful for a large amount of 
people, these goals have become a reality for many or remain a possibility for many to 
achieve, creating a significant amount of collective self-esteem.  In this way, not only has 
the AKP helped undermine the Kemalist’s identity through having an economically 
powerful constituency, but also it has helped consolidate the national identity they 
propose by showing that it is “distinctive, positive, and effective in obtaining the 
collective interest;”190 that of the AKP supporters. 
By making these changes not only were the desires of the pious Anatolian 
bourgeoisie satisfied, but also a large component of radical Islamist and Kurdish 
nationalists were content, who are mainly associated with the urban and rural poor, 
making them more “moderate.” “The AKP’s ex-Islamists appropriated the strategies by 
which the Islamists approached the poor, while dropping belligerent metaphors such as 
conquest.  Consequently they saw the AKP as their natural leaders against the elitism in 
Turkey, yet their combined movement did not entail a full spatial Islamization.”191  Many 
of these lower masses who were once extreme in their Islamist views now see that the 
most effective way to achieve their goals and living the “good life” as a pious Muslim is 
through taking advantage of the opportunities presented by democracy and capitalism.192  
For the Kurdish nationalists, the AKP has granted them greater voice by allowing them to 
use their Kurdish language in public places and allow them seats in parliament.  
“Erdogan uses all available means to appeal to Kurdish agenda by criticizing Turkish 
nationalism and presenting his party as the party of the excluded.  The Kurds see the 
AKP as an anti-Kemalist and historically oppressed party—just like themselves.”193  To 
be sure, the AKP has been more effective in pursuing Kurdish rights than other Kurdish  
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parties such as the Democratic Society Party [Demokratik Toplum Partisi] (DTP), and 
especially the violent ultra-nationalist Kurdistan Worker’s Party [Partiya Karkeren 
Kurdistan] (PKK).   
The AKP has therefore maintained power over its rivals because it has made itself 
appealing to groups within multiple classes of society that are not represented by 
Kemalists politics or had previously not been given the same opportunities as the 
Kemalists elite.  As a result of greater opportunities, many of these people that the AKP 
represent have flourished, or see the potential to flourish economically, while at the same 
time maintain their cultural identities. In this respect, the AKP is restoring Ozal’s legacy 
in further supporting an open economy, human rights, education, and supporting the 
lower masses through social welfare reforms through the concept of hizmet, or “rendering 
social services in the name of Islam.”194  This offers another example of how attractive 
these politics became following Ozal’s economic and political reforms. In reference to 
Erdogan’s policies, Yavuz suggests:  “He seeks to maintain the Ozalian philosophy of 
public management in terms of shifting the bureaucratic culture from the ‘mission of 
civilization’ to serving the people and improving their lives.”195 
This allowed the AKP to become very popular among a diverse group, much like 
the ANAP during the 1980s, because it encompassed the interests of multiple layers in 
society. “By democracy, the AKP means the process of determining the majority opinion 
…their conception of multiculturism means connecting the local with the global and the 
means by which a cross-fertilization of diverse ideas is possible.”196 Not surprisingly, 
this political stance has drawn a large amount of support from a wide variety of interest 
groups, that of “Islamic intellectuals seeking freedom of religious expression, Sunni 
Kurds seeking state recognition, the urban poor seeking social justice, and the new 
bourgeoisie advocating liberalization and the eradication of state subsidies for large 
corporations.”197  Moreover, just like Ozal, Erdogan is a very charismatic leader and 
people like his personality because the average Turk can identify with him.  In last year’s 
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opinion poll, 44 percent of Turks felt that “The personality of the candidate,” was the 
major factor in deciding their vote, while only 22 percent felt that their “political party” 
was the major factor in deciding their vote; other reasons for why people voted for 
particular candidates were at marginal percentages comparatively.198  In addition, many 
are pleased with the AKP’s social reform programs that they have launched throughout 
the years, such as building more new schools, hospitals, and paved roads.199 In 
preparation for the next municipal elections on March 29, 2009, Erdogan and his wife 
have handed out toys to children and even refrigerators and washing machines to the 
poor.200  Many people simply like the AKP’s charismatic gestures and their social reform 
programs, which tend to help the middle and lower classes of society rather than the rich.   
However, there is a significant paradox here.  Although the AKP stands for 
deregulation of the economy, over half of its voters were either at or below the poverty 
line and desire more state intervention and welfare.201  How can this large constituency 
of the AKP be attracted to a party that aggressively supports a free-market economy?  It 
is within this constituency that the AKP’s promulgation of cultural and moral idioms 
through a common belief in Islam towers over almost anything.  Although this is hard to 
believe at first, practicing Islam actually provides significant opportunities.  Before 1980, 
the only way to interact on a basis of mutual trust with other market spaces was through 
family and neighborhood ties.202 Since Islam is a source of social capital, informal 
religious networks, such as the Gulen movement, have been extremely useful in 
facilitating more reliable and trustworthy market conditions.203  Moreover, these informal 
religious networks allow the diverse communities within Turkey to socialize with each 
other and identify with each other on their common basis of Islam.204  But what is most 
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important to the people within these networks is that they provide people with upward 
social mobility and act to help pious people achieve their goals economically or 
politically.205 Significantly, these informal networks have also been instrumental in 
helping the AKP succeed through the personal contacts it makes with the local 
populous.206  Thus, it shows that an Islamic identity, which is propagated by the AKP, is 
important to all classes in Turkish society for not only spiritual reasons but also for 
economic and political gain.  
These interests are then supported through espousing historical aspirations in the 
form of Turkey’s Ottoman history, which has been instrumental in constructing the 
dominant national identity that presides over Turkey today.  Although this sense of 
Ottoman identity is most reflective in Turkey’s foreign policy, domestically it has helped 
create a source of national self-esteem by portraying an Ottoman past that was victorious, 
powerful, and glorious;207 something to aspire to in the future.  Since the AKP came to 
power, this Ottoman identity has been propagated through art, literature, cuisine, Islamic 
movements, and politics.208  “This ethnicized Ottoman tradition continues to have far 
greater resonance for the masses than the Kemalist-Republican construction, due to its 
symbolic power.”209  
Indeed, since the mid-1980s, the neo-Ottoman identity has gradually eclipsed the 
Kemalist nationalist identity in becoming the “national bond, the main source of identity, 
becoming the primary source of legitimacy for the AKP.”210  Opinion polls show that 
large majorities of people are quite religious.  As of April 2008, a poll asked, “On a scale 
of one to ten where one is not religious at all and ten is completely religious where would 
you place yourself,” 36 percent stated that they were completely religious, while another 
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40 percent stated that they were at least a five.211  More interestingly, a study by the 
Bosporus University in 2006 revealed that 45 percent of Turks say they are “Muslims 
first” (up from 36 percent in 1999) and 19 percent (down from 21 percent in 1999) said 
they were “Turkish first.” However, those same polls showed that support for religious-
based political parties has decreased from 41 percent to 25 percent since 1999.  “In other 
words: religion yes, but religion based politics no.”212  This suggests that by 2006 many 
Turks were at ease with the AKP’s moderate stance on Islam.  This greatly differs from 
other Islamist based countries such as Qatar and Sudan, or Islamic brotherhoods in 
Muslim countries such as Egypt, Palestine, or Algeria, which generally imply that politics 
and religion are one in the same.  The AKP has stated that it wants to continue to separate 
Islam from politics, but at the same time lift the state’s domination of Islam, which has 
been welcomed by Turkey’s Western allies.213  One can see that a moderate form of 
Islamic democracy has shaped Turkey’s identity; an identity, which embraces a 
democratic state, but still harbors the need to practice its religion more freely and take 
pride in its Islamic history and culture.   
By looking at Turkey’s 2007 general elections, one can see that many continue to 
agree with how Erdogan is leading the government.  The AKP received the largest 
plurality of 46.66% in 2007, which grew from 34.28% in 2002.214  Figure 1 shows the 
majority of the districts that voted for the AKP’s main opposition, the Republican 
People’s Party and the fundamentally secular Nationalist Movement Party, lie mainly 
within the sub-urban districts along the Mediterranean coast, but not the major cities of 
Istanbul or Ankara, where the urban poor outweigh the rich.  The outlying rural southeast 
is inhabited by mainly Kurds.  Interestingly, the AKP has grabbed many votes from these 
Kurdish districts, which typically vote for their own Kurdish parties. 
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Figure 1.   Turkish Electoral Geography of 2007 General Elections215 
Although the Turkish military has always had the power to intervene if any 
political entity disrupted Turkey’s secular democracy, they have very little 
maneuverability today due to Erdogan’s popularity and accumulation of power.  
Currently, the AKP could be labeled as a “moderate” Islamist Party.  However, recent 
developments suggest that this could change in the future.  When Erdogan and the AKP 
first came to power they had largely separated themselves from any “Islamic agenda.” 
But it is important to note that Erdogan once expressed hard-line Islamist views before he 
moved toward a moderate approach to Islam.  In 1999, Erdogan recited an Islamic poem 
stating, “Mosques are our barracks, domes our helmets, minarets our bayonets, believers 
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our soldiers.”216 He also claimed while he was the mayor of Istanbul that “Democracy is 
not an aim but a means to an end.”217 Due to Erdogan’s rhetoric in the past, many have 
feared that Erdogan will surreptitiously use democracy to gain support in coming to 
power with the underlying intent of forming a government driven by Islamic laws in the 
long run.  Until recently, this did not seem possible, nor did it even seem that Erdogan 
himself would want this, and maybe he still does not.  However, Erdogan’s authoritarian 
attitude, which has grown with his popularity, could potentially turn Turkey down a path 
that disregards secularism as well as its democracy if his recent authoritarian streak 
continues to manifest in the future.  Quite possibly, the synthetic identity that the AKP 
consolidated in its first term could evolve into a more traditional Islamist identity.  
So far, however, the AKP has only tried to give people a choice to express their 
religious beliefs rather than force religion upon them, such as is seen in Iran.  “Despite 
trepidation on the part of the military and its Western allies concerning the 
‘Islamicization’ of Turkish politics, the AKP did not impose Islamic law, but instead 
endorsed what can be described as a ‘Muslimhood’ model in which religious ethics 
inspire public service but overt religiosity is not part of an individual’s public political 
identity.”218  Instead of a purely Islamic position, Erdogan and the AKP have referred to 
the concept of “conservative democracy,” which espouses the need for pragmatic changes 
to undermine the Kemalist dogma that modernization means Westernization.  Yalcin 
Akdogan, a senior advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan states that the AKP is, “a mass 
party at the national level, conservative in values, with an appreciation of past history, 
culture, and religion.” Not that they are against economic development, technology, or 
modernization.  Indeed, the AKP and its constituents largely use Islam to garner greater 
social capital or trust.219  In turn, this enables them to gain more wealth and power, which 
is seen as equally important as being religious for the moral and spiritual sake.220  Instead 
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of being anti-modernization or anti-globalist they would rather maintain their Islamic-
Ottoman heritage and cultural image, while at the same time adhere to modernization, 
globalization, and democratization on their own cultural terms. Erdogan proposes: 
A significant part of Turkish society desires to adopt a concept of 
modernity that does not reject tradition, a belief in universalism that 
accepts localism, an understanding of rationalism that does not disregard 
the spiritual meaning of life, and a choice for change that is not 
fundamentalist. The concept of conservative democracy is, in fact, an 
answer to this desire.221 
Although this concept has come under criticism because it has little historical intellectual 
support,222 it does show that Erdogan has attempted to bring the government’s politics 
toward the “center;” neither rejecting the importance of secularism and nationalism nor 
religion and Ottoman culture.  Rather, Erdogan has sought to enmesh and connect the 
ideas of the state with the cultural ideas of society to arrive at what he and the AKP 
perceives as the larger collective interest in the nation.   
However, it would be folly to say that Erdogan and the AKP do not maintain a 
degree of Islamism.  Two primary examples of this, which have been met with a large 
amount of controversy, is in the AKP’s failed attempts to impose laws that prohibit 
adultery and end the ban of the use of women wearing headscarves in public areas.223  
The adultery law has come under enormous scrutiny because of the perception that this 
would be used primarily against women.224  Indeed, the AKP’s more conservative branch 
seems to have little regard for women’s rights as they concur that women are naturally 
subordinate to men who are the only ones suitable for making decisions in the public 
domain; as a result, men dominate the AKP’s decision-making body.225  But Erdogan 
suggests instead that this law will “help women” because this law will “strengthen the 
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family, thus strengthening the country.”226  Although this focus on “family values” seems 
virtuous, it actually is not by modern standards, because the “family” is mostly “defined 
in terms of patriarchal values.”227  As one can see, conservative aspects of Islamic 
politics are still present in the mind of Erdogan.  On the other hand, Erdogan’s initiative 
to lift the ban on women wearing headscarves is positively viewed inside and outside of 
Turkey. Referring to public opinion in 2008, 63% of people were “not bothered at all” by 
the use of headscarves in universities, hospitals, or by the wives of ministers and 
bureaucrats, while only 19–21% were “disturbed a lot.”228  As well, the international 
community sees it as one example in which Turkey is becoming more liberal, even 
though these reforms have been hampered by secularists suspicions.229  
However, at the same time, Erdogan and the AKP have been slow to reform penal 
codes, which are notorious for their broad meaning and being used for political purposes, 
such as prohibiting people from “insulting Turkishness” or being a “member of an illegal 
organization.”230 If the AKP stands for democracy, it would aggressively promote all 
individual rights, not just religious ones.  However, some of these less-than-democratic 
laws have actually benefited the AKP now that Erdogan is comfortably seated as a 
popular Prime Minister.  Recently, it seems that the AKP has aggressively moved to 
eliminate large amounts of its opposition.  One example is Erdogan suppressing the 
Dogan Media Group with a $1.7 billion fine due to its being highly critical of his 
policies.231  It should be noted, however, that this media conglomerate has been 
instrumental in undermining any opposition to the Kemalist elite for the last few decades.  
In addition, the highly controversial Ergenekon investigation has been another example 
of the AKP suppressing its opposition.  After alleged plans to overthrow the AKP-led 
government in another “soft coup” were revealed in 2008, the Ergenekon case was 
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opened to target the supposed perpetrators.  Some see this as another tool used by the 
AKP to silence the AKP’s secular opposition by targeting and imprisoning many high-
profile secular businesses, generals, judges, opinion makers, political leaders, and 
citizens.232  Much like the McCarthy trials in the U.S. during the Cold War, the 
Ergenekon case has turned into a similar political “witch hunt.” 
It used legal loopholes to pass the media into the hands of its supporters, 
resulting in half of the Turkish media falling into the hands of pro-AKP 
businesses and the rest facing massive putative tax fines. Large, secular 
Turkish businesses fear the AKP's financial police and tax audits, while 
judges and generals have been targeted in the Ergenekon case for 
allegedly planning a coup against the AKP government. Illegal and legal 
wiretaps are now common, justified as necessary for collecting evidence 
for the Ergenekon case. Whether there was actually a coup plot, Turkey's 
judges, opinion makers, generals, businessmen, political leaders and plain 
citizens are fearful of opposing the government because they worry that 
their private conversations will be wiretapped or they will be arrested for 
association with the alleged coup.233 
This is the first time the secular establishment has not been in a solid position to 
overthrow the government or had the necessary backing from the media or powerful 
businessmen to construct a formidable voice against their opposition.  A lack of checks 
and balances to the AKP could ultimately lead to less democratization and more 
authoritarianism, only this time around it would not be Kemalist authoritarianism, but 
potentially a more Islamist type led by the AKP.  
With that said, it may be a bit overly optimistic to pin a modern democratic label 
on the AKP.  To be sure, due to his growing popularity, Erdogan has begun to centralize 
his power in a more authoritarian mode.  All AKP members of parliament are expected to 
agree with the bills Erdogan proposes, and when they don’t, they are investigated and 
discharged.234  “Although the AKP has presented itself as a model of ‘democratizing the 
party structure’ in Turkey, power has eventually been concentrated in the hands of 
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Erdogan and the experiment with internal democratization of the party appears to have 
ended with his increasing popularity.”235 Since the AKP has the largest amount of 
parliament members, many of the Erdogan’s decisions go unchecked.  Although many 
find the AKP’s Islamic posture a threat, especially the Kemalist elite and military who 
have lost a considerable amount of power because of the AKP’s popularity, most of the 
middle and lower classes (as well as the upper classes who benefit from the AKP) of 
Turkish society have requested this sort of leader-centric, majoritarian government rather 
than a strong plurality, which is vital for a stable democracy.  As stated before, the 
personality of the candidate is more important to one’s vote than anything else. In this 
respect, Erdogan’s charisma may actually be getting in the way of furthering Turkey’s 
democracy.  
Due to this dwindling plurality within the AKP and Erdogan’s authoritarian line, 
there is little stopping Erdogan from taking on a more Islamist policy.  Recent evidence 
in the last year (2009) shows a return to Erdogan’s more hard-line Islamist view exhibited 
during the 1990s, especially in regard to its former stance on religious tolerance.  
Although the AKP has helped make Turkey more comfortable with its Islamic heritage, it 
has not continued to show respect for other types of religious people, namely the Jews.  
Considering that the Ottoman Empire had always been tolerant of its large Jewish and 
Christian minorities,236 the recent rise in anti-Semitism in Turkey actually runs counter to 
an Ottoman-Islamic identity.  A Pew survey in 2008 found that 76 percent of Turks have 
a negative view toward Jews, up from 49 percent in 2004.237 Many are angry at Israel 
since the Gaza conflict in December 2008 to January 2009, including the United Nations 
Human Rights Council, which has endorsed a damning report on Israel for allegedly 
committing war crimes.238  Naturally, Turkey, a predominantly Muslim state, has been 
passionate in their response to the killings of fellow Muslims in Palestine.  However, 
what is frightening about this development is that the central government under Erdogan 
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has actually fostered and encouraged an anti-Semitic attitude.  Erdogan and the AKP 
have used propaganda suggesting that Jews as well as Americans are “evil.”  One such 
example was a state-sponsored cartoon exhibit in Istanbul’s Taksim Square (much like 
New York’s Time’s Square) in February 2009, which depicted Israelis killing Palestinian 
civilians with American help.239  Not surprisingly, widespread propaganda such as this 
has inflamed anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism throughout Turkey.  Are Israel and the 
United States becoming the “significant others” from which Turkey’s new dominant 
national identity can define itself against?  This could be a passing phase, but it is 
important for policy makers to be aware of this development.  The AKP’s policies have 
been effective and influential enough to help consolidate the synthetic identity born out 
of the mid-1980s.  Quite possibly, if the AKP continues to endorse this lack of tolerance, 
this synthetic neo-Ottoman identity could evolve into something much different. 
A. THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY’S FOREIGN POLICY  
It has been established that there is a new dominant national identity in Turkey, 
which has been solidified by the AKP.  As well, the implications this has had on the 
Turkish state and society have also been illustrated.  Now a parallel to this change in 
national identity will be drawn with Turkey’s shifting foreign policy.  Without a doubt, 
the AKP’s new foreign policy is one of the most significant changes seen from Turkey.  
Throughout its secular history, Turkey has shown extensive support of Europe and the 
United States through various policies, such as being the first and only Muslim nation to 
recognize Israel as a state in 1948, becoming one of the first members of NATO in 1953, 
allowing the United States to position its Jupiter missiles in Turkey against the Soviet 
threat, allying itself with the U.S. and United Nations in the 1991 Gulf War, and 
continuing to make a vigilant effort in its European Union accession plans.   
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Arguably, the most important facet to the AKP’s foreign policy has been its 
robust commitment in becoming a member of the European Union.  Along with its 
economic reforms, the AKP has made accession into the EU its main priority.240   
Pressure for change has come from within, from the ordinary people fed 
up with the failures of the status quo; it’s also been motivated by the 
dominant issue of Turkish political life – that long pursuit of membership 
of the European Union. The idea of Europe doesn’t appeal to everyone, 
but it has been the glue, which as kept the reformers together. The liberal 
middle classes already see themselves as European; most of the business 
community thinks closer ties with the EU will bring stability and increase 
trade and investment; Islamists hope reform will be accompanied by a 
more relaxed attitude toward religion, and the Kurds and other minorities 
see it as a guarantee of greater cultural freedom.241 
According to a Turkish public opinion poll taken in April 2008, 61 percent think 
that “Turkey’s membership in the European Union is a good thing” and only 28 percent 
felt that it was a “bad thing,” while 13 percent said “neither.”242  This shows that many 
people support the AKP’s strong stance on acquiring EU membership.  Although a large 
majority views the EU as a tool for economic development and a reduction in 
unemployment (35 percent), many see it as a way to establish equal rights, social peace, 
decrease corruption, increase Turkey’s international influence, and strengthen 
democracy.243  These reforms, in return, agree with a significant amount of the 
population mainly because of the positive economic implications but also as a way to 
undermine the Kemalists’ control over society.  However, even with Turkey’s hopes for 
EU membership, which the U.S. fully supports, Turkey’s traditionally unwavering 
support for the U.S. has changed considerably in recent years.   
Since the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, Turkey has viewed its relationship with the 
U.S. as less of a benefit and more of hindrance to its foreign policy goals.244  The Bush 
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administration’s interests were at critical odds with Turkey’s national interest since 2003.  
The war in Iraq only emboldened the Kurdish movement to establish autonomy in 
Northern Iraq, which is one of Turkey’s greatest concerns due to the fear of an uprising 
among their own large population of Kurds (about 20 percent of Turkey’s population).245  
In October 2004, a Turkish think tank gave a foreign policy perception survey through a 
public opinion poll.  When asked, “From which country do you perceive the most threat 
to Turkey?” the U.S. was ranked number one.246  Thus, Turkey is less likely to yield to 
the United States’ influence if it is not aligned with its own national interest. This is 
atypical of Turkey because previous ruling parties have placed a large emphasis on the 
strategic and economic importance of maintaining a strong relationship with the U.S.247 
Now the AKP has a more Ankara-EU-centric foreign policy, which focuses and balances 
strategic cooperation with a variety of powers between the EU, Eurasia, and the Middle 
East. 248 
This is not to say that the AKP has totally abandoned its ties and hopes for better 
relations with the U.S.  Indeed, Turkey and the U.S. still share many interests and both 
countries can benefit if they work together.  However, the AKP has recognized the 
benefits of its cultural Islamic and Ottoman past and has used this link to build social 
capital and better relations with much of Muslim world; regions that have long been 
looked down upon by Turkey since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.249  AKP officials 
assert that this is not an attempt to “spread Islam” but only for the purposes of expanding 
strategic and economic foreign policies that are important to Turkey’s interests.250  A 
“return to history”251 further supports the idea that Turkey has redefined the dominant 
national identity that attempts to combine its Islamic as well as its Western interests.  
Through developing this new identity, however, Turkey’s stance has moved, and will 
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continue to move, away from being alleged as a mere “Western wannabe”252 and work 
more independently outside of U.S. influence.  As Fuller has noted, “Turkey is going to 
be Turkey and not a ‘US ally’ in the way it perceives its interests.”253 
Soon after the AKP won its election in 2002, its first gesture of a new independent 
form of foreign policy was seen in its firm rejection of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division that 
would enable U.S. troops to invade Iraq from Turkish soil.  Without Saddam Hussein in 
power, Turkish representatives feared that this would result in Iraq losing its grip on the 
Kurdish cities of Kirkuk and Mosul (Mosul having large oil reserves), which could be 
used by the Kurds to establish the center of a Kurdish state.  Therefore, Turkey was much 
opposed to the U.S. invasion, which would ultimately lead to a “[Turkish] head-on 
collision with the Iraqi Kurds.”254  It was not just the AKP who were concerned about the 
U.S. invasion; even the Turkish military feared “a war within a war” when the U.S. 
armed the peshmerga, the Kurdish militia, with heavy weaponry.255  As a result, 68 
members of the AKP opposed going to war and another 32 abstained in their vote in 
parliament.256  Aiding the U.S. invasion was simply not in Turkey’s interest.  Emin Sirin, 
one of the AKP lawmakers who disagreed with Turkey’s involvement in Iraq said, “We 
don’t like how we were pushed around by the Americans. They seem to think that we 
could be bought off, but we had real security concerns about what Iraq would look like 
after Saddam.  They never addressed those concerns.”257   
However, many deputies within the Turkish parliament supported involvement in 
the Iraq war, including Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and AKP party leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan.  They did this to show parliament’s ongoing support for the U.S., as well as 
their fear that Turkey would be powerless in Iraq’s rebuilding process. The Turkish 
parliament’s lack of a mere three votes in support of going to war is a testament to this.  
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But the end result was Turkey rejecting the U.S. 4th Infantry Division and the U.S. lost its 
strategic ability to launch a northern assault from Turkey’s southern border.  Even though 
the U.S. may not have been as empathetic and foresighted in its concerns toward Turkey, 
it is important to note that the vast majority of the AKP opposed support of the United 
States.   
Frictional ties only increased later that year when Turkish Special Forces were 
arrested by U.S. troops outside of Kirkuk on July 4, 2003.  They were disarmed and 
detained with sacks over their heads for reportedly being involved in “disturbing 
behavior.”258  This caused a huge uproar among the Turkish population. Gunduz Aktan, a 
retired diplomat and newspaper columnist, reflects Turkey’s common attitude, "Have 
Americans forgotten how they felt when they saw their diplomats, eyes bandaged, 
dragged out of the [US embassy in] Tehran during Khomeini's revolution?  Turks today 
feel the same thing about US treatment of their soldiers. Like Americans, they too will 
not forget."259  Today there are even Turkish books and movies available that are based 
on this incident creating continued distain and distrust toward the United States.260  
Ultimately, the beginning stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom augmented the already tense 
relations between the U.S. and Turkey.  
Although U.S.-Turkey relations are not completely shattered, Turkey has 
presently realized that seeking other partnerships and relations outside of U.S. friendly 
allies could benefit them more than simply aligning their foreign policy initiatives with 
the U.S.  This is prevalent in the AKP’s newfound proposals to court better ties with the 
Middle East.  This initiative first started with Syria, a country that has always had hostile 
relations with the U.S.261  This may soon change, however, with President Obama’s 
vision of using more diplomacy with these countries rather than simply isolating them.  
Nevertheless, Turkey will arguably continue to offer peaceful political and economic 
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cooperation with Syria.262  When Erdogan visited Syria in April 2008, he called on the 
Syrians to follow Turkey’s economic reform model, reminding them how their national 
income had increased from $230 billion to $659 billion since 2003.  He stated, “This can 
easily be done in Syria…We are willing to put our hand in yours!”263  In Syria, Erdogan 
is also seen as bringing fair balance to negotiations with the ongoing Syrian-Israeli 
disputes.   
Erdogan has disagreed with Israeli policies on a number of occasions and has 
never shied away from letting all know his discontent.  Most recently, during the 2009 
Davos Conference, Erdogan passionately responded to Israeli President Shimon Peres’ 
comments regarding Israeli attacks in Gaza and abruptly walked out.  In his reply to 
Peres, Erdogan remarked, “You kill people, I remember the children who died on 
beaches. I remember two former prime ministers who said they felt very happy when 
they were able to enter Palestine on tanks.”264  When Erdogan got back to Ankara, 
jubilant crowds warmly received him claiming that he was the “Conqueror of Davos.”265  
This shows that many Turks are pleased with the manner in which their Prime Minister 
has conducted himself regarding his new policy toward Israel.  
But there is a significant problem in the moralistic line Erdogan and the AKP 
have taken toward Israel, Jews, and the United States.  Considering Syria is a known 
abuser of human rights, how can they chastise Israel and sing its praises of Syria?266  
This anti-Israeli popular opinion is exemplified further in a Turkish TV show that 
recently showed Israel as killing innocent Palestinian civilians.  As a result of the 
increased tensions between the two long-time allies, Erdogan has postponed, and even 
threatened to cancel, the October 2009 joint military exercises with Israel that have been 
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posted in Turkey annually since 1996.267  Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davotoglu 
has stated, “Our attitude will be unchanged as long as the tragic events in Gaza 
continue.”268 On the other hand, the AKP’s expression of solidarity with Syria and 
Palestine has been much to the displeasure of Israel and the U.S.  Bettering relations with 
Syria, despite United States’ policy, signals a breaking away from Turkey’s traditional 
path of foreign policy.  Following his decision to postpone Turkish-Israeli-U.S. military 
exercises, Erdogan stated, “Anyone who exercises political power has to take account of 
public opinion…I can’t just put the calls from the public to one side, it’s a question of 
sincerity…I want people to know that Turkey is a powerful country which makes its own 
decisions.  We don’t take orders from anyone.”269 Although Turkey could still remain 
partners with Israel, if it continues to take a more assertive stance on the Palestinian or 
Syrian side of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Turkey will not likely be able to continue 
taking a mediator role, which may prove not as important to them as gaining a more 
leader-like role among Muslim states in the Middle East and North Africa.   
On the other side of its border, Turkey has extended its political and economic 
ties to Iran, which serves as further evidence that the AKP is making a strong effort to 
balance its voice throughout the Middle East.  In spite of the United States strong 
discouragement, Turkey has opened up to Iran through various energy and security plans. 
One significant example is an extension from Iran to the Nabucco pipeline, which would 
export Iranian oil and gas through Ankara to Europe.  The EU fully supports Iranian 
energy being transported through Turkey so that it is not completely dependent on 
Russia.270  Although the U.S. is extremely opposed to this project, Turkey is nevertheless 
pursuing it through offering to help fund and build the infrastructure needed.271 In 
addition, Turkey has also told Tehran that they would not allow Israel its airspace to 
conduct an attack on Iran.  Whether the U.S. likes it or not, Turkey relies on Iran for their 
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natural gas and they will continue to make economic and security deals as long as it is in 
line with its national interest.  Although the AKP is not always pleased with Iranian 
leadership, it is willing to draw upon the two countries cultural and historical ties in the 
hopes of better stable and peaceful relations.  President Gul was able to play on this when 
he publicly stated to Iran in reference to their nuclear energy projects, “All countries must 
open themselves up to internal criticism and self-examination in keeping with Islamic 
values.”272  However, more recently Erdogan has taken a protective role toward Iran and 
their president, Mahmoud Ahmadinajad, saying “There is no doubt he is our friend.  We 
have kept very good relations and we have no difficulty at all.”273  In spite of Iran’s 
attempts to build nuclear weapons, seen as extremely belligerent by the West, Erdogan 
stated that it is “unfair that Iran be told to not produce nuclear weapons from those who 
already have them.”274  But Turkey is a NATO country and supporting Iran’s nuclear 
program goes against NATO’s nuclear defense policy. “As Erdogan questions why the 
United States possesses nuclear weapons, some of which are deployed in Turkey, he first 
of all contradicts NATO policy.”275 One can see that Turkey’s relations with its southern 
neighbors Syria, Palestine, and Iran have warmed significantly, while relations with its 
traditional allies, the United States, Israel, and even NATO have cooled.  
Turkey is of course not limited to ingratiating itself with the southern countries 
mentioned above.  It has also reached out to other countries in the Middle East, North 
Africa, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. “The latest developments reaffirm the role that 
this particular government wants to give Turkey and Turkish foreign policy- as the big 
brother of Islamic countries.”276 Since the AKP came to power, exports to the Middle 
East and North Africa have increased sevenfold to $31 billion in 2008.277  Because of its 
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common cultural ground with the Middle East and Turkey’s strong economy, the U.S. 
sees Turkey as being one of the primary facilitators of stabilization when it leaves Iraq.  
Additionally, Turkey has revamped its relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia.  
Most notably is Turkey’s construction of Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and its 
planned connections to this pipeline, such as the Nabucco pipeline that will stretch from 
Erzerum in central Anatolia to Vienna.  Other pipeline plans consist of Turkey 
connecting to Turkmenistan, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq.278  Not only does this diversify 
Turkey’s energy resources but it also makes them a central hub between east, west, north, 
and south as the primary energy intermediary.  Although Turkey’s relations with its 
regional neighbors go beyond pipeline politics, these energy plans show significant 
developments in bettering its ties with new partners, many of which had been previously 
ignored or shunned.   
In this way, Turkey’s Ottoman legacy and Islamic culture in its new foreign 
policy has served as a useful link to integrating more trade, opening more markets, and 
bettering security relations with its neighbors.  This is important to Turkey, but beyond 
that, the consequence of these relations present an opportunity for generating regional 
peace and stability; albeit as long as Turkey discontinues its positive opinion of Iran’s 
nuclear weapons program.279  Although Turkey’s foreign policy has drifted away from a 
U.S.-centric mindset, Turkey still desires to work together with the U.S. to solve issues 
such as Iraq, Israeli- Syria, Israeli-Palestine, Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh territory, security of energy sources, terror, and democratization and 
stability of the Middle East.280  However, all of these essential issues require more than 
Turkey’s good will.  Turkey will also need the United States’ help in attaining many of 
its goals.281   
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In order to enable decision makers to adequately understand and predict Turkish 
foreign policy decisions, the United States needs to continuously analyze Turkey’s 
internal politics with the context of Turkish national identity.  This starts through 
examining the Turkish ruling party’s political and economic reforms and how the Turkish 
public reacts and identifies with these reforms. Since the U.S. has many interests in the 
Middle East and Eurasia, it is crucial that the U.S. understands Turkey’s evolving identity 
because it reflects much of its changing foreign policy, which affects the U.S. and its own 
goals in the region. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE ASSESSMENT 
Belonging or identifying with a group is a powerful sociological experience that 
can significantly impact the consciousness and thus the interests and actions taken by 
individuals.  Although this idea of “collective identity” can be seen at various levels, it 
has an especially important effect at the national level.  National identity is important 
because the group’s interest at the national stage affects the policies of the state.282  
However, since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, its national identity has been 
divided; many did not even identify with the nation.  Only recently has this societal 
fragmentation been melded together more broadly.  To a large extent, this is a result of 
the current ruling party, the AKP, representing a national image in which Turks can take 
greater comfort, confidence, pride, and satisfaction: that of the neo-Ottoman identity. 
From 1923 to 1980, the Kemalist aims to base the sole national identity on the 
prescriptions of Ataturk dominated the country. This was not necessarily because the 
majority of people imagined themselves under these nationalistic or Kemalist 
characteristics, rather it was more a result of the statist power that resided in the Kemalist 
elite and military, which prohibited others from publically identifying with anything other 
than Kemalism.283  By 1980, though, the overarching power of the state started to wane 
as democracy became more prevalent.  The underground networks of society that grew 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s were then able to voice their opinions openly, organize, 
and take action more freely.  During the 1980s, these groups, which mainly consisted of 
the lower and middle masses, still had little power to undermine the Kemalist state 
ideology.  However, by using the economic and political liberalization reforms of Turgut 
Ozal during the mid-1980s, these lower and middle classes amassed more power through 
gaining wealth and capital, forming a new bourgeoisie. They became what has been 
labeled as the new Anatolian bourgeoisie.284   
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In their economic, social, and political ascent the masses of society carried with 
them an identity that was quite different from their rival, the Kemalists.  This identity 
reflects an image that incorporates, rather than prohibits, a degree of Islamic practices 
and Turkey’s Ottoman culture and history.   Drawing on lessons from Sufi orders such as 
Naksibendi, the followers of Said Nursi, or most recently the guidance of the socio-
political Islamic movement inspired by Fetullah Gulen,285 the interests of average Turks 
fell more in line with the values prescribed by these Islamic teachings. At the same time, 
these Islamic teachings did not have a fundamentalist mentality, but supported modernity, 
tolerance of other religions, democracy, and a free market economy.  Islamic intellectuals 
combined with the new Anatolian bourgeoisie promoted a synthesis between Ottoman-
Islamic traditions with modern global ideas, many of which are seen as effective in 
advancing Western countries.  This synthesis of values and traditions reflects a new 
identity that has grown into a dominant national identity today; what has been described 
as the “neo-Ottoman” identity.286  Turks seemed to identify with a neo-Ottoman image 
more so than the Kemalist identity because it reflects parts of their Ottoman traditions 
and history, which are still deeply felt.  This is represented in the largest portion of the 
Turkish population taking pride in Islamic practices and Ottoman aesthetics and symbols, 
such as art, literature, music, and food.  In addition, this identity was effective in creating 
a sense of self-esteem among those who associated themselves with these principles.  
Many of these Turks that identified with a neo-Ottoman image became successful or 
prosperous and provided a practical image toward which many would want to aspire.287 
As a result of the historical aspirations and effectiveness of neo-Ottomanism, the 
neo-Ottoman identity grew until it became solidified in 2002 with the election of the 
AKP as the dominant political party.  As the neo-Ottoman identity was consolidated as 
the dominant national identity in Turkey, this change in identity paralleled a change in 
Turkey’s foreign policy.  This has become apparent in the AKP-led government’s new 
initiatives to court better ties with its southern and eastern neighbors from which it has 
either a historical link or a religious link.  As a more powerful economic player among 
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these countries, Turkey has sought to embolden itself as a regional leader.  However, just 
as the neo-Ottoman identity places considerable importance on historical, religious, and 
cultural ideas, it also maintains modern and global ideas.  Thus, Turkey has not turned its 
back on the most modern and advanced states that exist in the West.  Indeed, the AKP 
remains a member of NATO and a strong supporter of accession in the EU.288 
Nevertheless, the shape of this synthetic identity could change in the near future.  
As stated before, “identities are never static and are always changing.”289  For the past 
seven years the AKP has shown that it can balance and blend multiple values into one 
synthetic identity much like it has balanced foreign relations on all sides of its borders 
through its “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy.290 Though a few things have 
changed over these years that could suggest Turkey building a closer relation to its south 
and east rather than a complete balance on all sides.  One such thing that has changed is 
Turkey’s potential for becoming a member of the EU.  Although some EU members find 
Turkey a prime candidate for admission, the two major powers in the EU, France and 
Germany, do not view Turkey as anything more than a “privileged partner.”291   At the 
same time, Iranian and Egyptian influence in the Middle East and North Africa has 
waned over the last decade leaving an opening for regional leadership.292  With a 
growing economic powerbase, a common religious and historical background, and 
gaining the respect of Arab countries through berating the U.S. for the war in Iraq and 
Israel for its attacks in Gaza, Turkey could provide that regional leadership, which may 
seem more beneficial to them than chasing dreams of EU membership.293  In addition,  
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Turkey has continued to make themselves an attractive partner to states in the Balkans, 
the Caucasus, and Central Asia, which could possibly propel them to leadership status in 
these regions in the future as well. 
This independent foreign policy and regional leadership does not necessarily 
bother the United States and its allies.  Indeed the U.S. would actually prefer Turkey to 
take up such a role as a leader among its neighbors as it represents a more modern-secular 
Muslim democracy and NATO ally.294  In this way, Turkey could portray itself as an 
effective democratic model for other Muslim states and societies, reducing radical 
Islamist tendencies.  This is especially important as the U.S. has taken a blow to its 
popularity in the Middle East due to its war in Iraq.  More importantly, when the U.S. 
finally pulls out of Iraq, it is going to need a powerful and influential partner, like 
Turkey, to help stabilize Iraq.  But even though Turkey will continue relations with its 
Western allies, the days of Turkey being an unwavering support force to the U.S. are 
over. 
It will be worrisome to the U.S. if Turkey continues to take Iran’s side on the 
nuclear debate.  Another problematic development is the deterioration in relations 
between Turkey and Israel.  Although Turkey’s harsh rhetoric toward Israel may merely 
be a fleeting move to court better ties with Muslim states in the Middle East and North 
Africa, the growing degree of anti-Semitism in Turkey is hard to ignore.  One must also 
ask how long Turkey will reprimand Israel or how far it will go in seeking the respect of 
its Muslim neighbors.  Even though these rhetorical attacks on Israel received praise from 
fellow Muslim states, it will not help them internationally, nor will Turkey’s derision 
help mend the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian conflicts.  
The most worrisome matter about Turkey and the AKP, is its leader, Erdogan.  
Indeed, Erdogan’s growing autocratic behavior should be observed carefully.  It is 
important for the AKP to maintain a significant degree of opposition for the ongoing 
development of Turkey to continue effectively and peacefully.  However, it is in the 
author’s opinion that Turkey’s civil society, military, and diverse population, are too 
strong for authoritarianism to manifest.  Moreover, there are only a few warning signs 
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that signal a reverse course toward political instability or external hostility.  Overall, 
internally and externally, Turkey is performing well.  It would be unwise to say that these 
developments are permanent.  Indeed they could vanish as quickly as they cropped up.   
It is important for U.S. policy makers to become aware of what Turkey’s aims are 
and why.   This starts in examining Turkey’s national identity.  This can be done through 
observing Turkish society’s response to their current ruling party’s political, societal, and 
economic policy-making and how well Turks identify with those decisions.  
Understanding Turkey’s national identity allows one to forecast likely scenarios about 
Turkey’s future foreign.  Since the United States has large interests in the regions that 
Turkey has a growing influential role, such as the Middle East, Europe, and Eurasia, it is 
critical that the United States understands what drives Turkey’s foreign policy. 
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